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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to understand the role of New Zealand’s national identity in the Japan-New 
Zealand relationship to examine how identities and values have shaped New Zealand’s 
policies and diplomatic interaction with Japan. Four key identities are identified which 
contribute to New Zealand’s national self-image as a whole and illustrate the malleability of 
identity; the historically cultural British identity, the “search for independence” moral 
identity, the construction of an Asia Pacific state identity and the perception of New Zealand 
as a ‘good international citizen’ with liberally democratic values. To explore the role these 
identities and New Zealand’s perceptions of Japan have had on shaping bilateral relations, 
this thesis analyses multiple issues and policy decisions from 1945 till 2014 using the 
theoretical framework of Constructivism. It draws from a range of secondary literature, 
government documents, news sources, official speeches and various organisation’s 
publications from throughout this time frame. The research seeks to give a better 
understanding of how New Zealand’s national identity has evolved over time in response to 
domestic affairs and examine how it has contributed to shaping New Zealand’s relationship 
with Japan. It uncovers that the Japan-New Zealand relationship has developed significantly 
in the last seventy years and the role of identity can offer explanations regarding the ways in 
which New Zealand’s understanding of itself has helped shape its bilateral relationship with 
Japan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An analysis of the development of New Zealand’s relations with Japan over approximately 
the last sixty years may be considered a useful case study as it reveals New Zealanders 
changing perspectives and attitudes to their own country and to other states. The notion that 
a states domestic situation and identity inform their foreign policies is not a new theory, and 
has been used as an explanatory tool in much international analysis. New Zealand’s different 
identities explain much about the origins of the nation’s interests in their foreign policy 
choices and relationship with Japan. This thesis will trace the New Zealand-Japan 
relationship from the end of the Second World War until the present day, while focusing on 
how the nature of the relationship has evolved due to New Zealand’s response to Japan 
difference. The Japan-New Zealand relationship has developed significantly in the last 
seventy years and the role which identity has played can offer explanations about the ways 
in which the New Zealand understanding of itself has helped shape its relationship with 
Japan.  
Despite a predominantly strong relationship, New Zealand has encountered various 
problematic and conflictual situations in their bilateral relations with Japan. The initial 
uncertainty as to whether to establish relations with Japan, the difference in culture and a 
lack of common understanding have created challenges. Environmental issues, such as the 
New Zealand nuclear free policy and Japan’s whaling programme, have illustrated the 
differences and misunderstandings between both countries. These issues have created 
tension in an otherwise harmonious relationship. However, both countries also have many 
shared interests and these are founded in common values which raises a number of questions. 
Why have these disputes and differences arisen?  Why has the relationship remained strong 
despite significant challenges? I argue that an important part of the answer lies in New 
Zealand national identity and how this has shaped the country’s foreign policy with Japan. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
How have New Zealand perceptions of, and relations with, Japan evolved from 1945 to the 
present, and to what extent has New Zealand’s own identity influenced this development? 
The research question of this thesis is concerned with the changing perception and 
relationship New Zealand has had with Japan and the situations and issues which have 
strained the otherwise strong economic and diplomatic relationship. This thesis argues that 
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a constructivist analysis is more convincing in explaining New Zealand’s evolving 
relationship with Japan than a rational account. I therefore argue that the challenges, 
difficulties and issues which have arisen in the bilateral relationship can be attributed to 
difference in national identities between both countries.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following pages consider four key identities that all contribute to New Zealand’s 
national self-image as a whole and illustrate the malleability of identity. By looking at how 
New Zealand's identity or perception of what kind of state it is and wants to be with regards 
to other states, it becomes apparent how this identity influences its interests and foreign 
policy. This thesis will argue that a state will make decisions regarding its national interest 
based on its notion of what kind of state it is and how this is different to other states. These 
identities have evolved over time in response to domestic affairs and a changing international 
context and have contributed to shaping New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. After 
providing an overview of the extant literature on New Zealand-Japan relations, scholarship 
surrounding New Zealand national identity in foreign policy, and establishing the theoretical 
framework, the research will discuss the following. 
First, it will outline the identity that emerged from New Zealand’s historical and cultural ties 
with Britain, which was most apparent during the early years of contact with Japan. An 
analysis of this identity will demonstrate how this culturally Western influence shaped New 
Zealand’s perceptions of Japan and Japanese people during the post war decade and how 
these attitudes were reflected in foreign policy choices and interaction with Japan in the 
following decade. It will then consider New Zealand’s emerging Asia Pacific identity and 
how the construction of this identity caused the New Zealand government to pursue policies 
and actions which would give it a greater understanding of Japan and take steps to minimise 
the inherently different cultural identities which caused challenges within the relationship. 
New Zealand’s growing sense of being an Asia Pacific state and the values this entails 
informs this identity. The cultural barrier and lack of common sentimentality and traditions 
which New Zealand shares with traditional partners prompted New Zealand to make efforts 
to strengthen cultural, diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. It will then analyse 
New Zealand’s moral identity, in which it’s “search for independence” created a national 
self-image which New Zealand presented externally as one which sought to be a moral 
example to the rest of the world. Domestic affairs and an emerging nationalism saw the 
evolution of a nuclear free norm and a broader identity of an environmentally responsible, 
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pacifist and strongly independent country. This identity has played a significant role in 
influencing New Zealand’s bilateral relations with Japan and has been the source of much 
of New Zealand’s conflict and disagreement with Japan, in particular the nuclear issue and 
Japan’s scientific whaling programme in the South Pacific Sea. Finally, it will consider how 
New Zealand’s democratic political system and culture with a strong commitment to 
multilateralism, a rules based international order and belief in a capitalist free market 
economy has formed a foundation upon which the bilateral relationship has been built. 
Ultimately, the thesis will demonstrate that New Zealand’s views of Japan, and therefore its 
interactions with the country, have been overwhelmingly shaped by its own domestic affairs 
and identity. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND EXTANT LITERATURE  
1.1 Overview of Relations  
In 2000, Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff said of the New Zealand-Japan relationship: 
 “Today our relationship with Japan is rich and multidimensional. Arguably no other Asian 
country has had more impact on our economy and our lifestyles than Japan. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the Japan-New Zealand relationship today is a fine example of both 
countries ability to establish ties across traditional cultural boundaries.”1 
While the claim that Japan is New Zealand’s most important trading partner in Asia may no 
longer true, it is clear that the Japan-New Zealand relationship is a unique one in the sense 
that Japan was the first country in which New Zealand was required to use a strategy to 
respond to Japan difference and ensure a mutually beneficial relationship. Subsequent close 
relations followed with other Asian nations, such as China, but Japan was the first Asian sate 
which New Zealand encountered significant challenges which arose due to difference in 
history, language and culture. As Ann Trotter claims, New Zealanders have perceived Japan 
with varying degrees of “ignorance, interest, indifference and intensity.”2 Japan has evolved 
from “menace to major trading partner”3 and the New Zealand government and public had 
to consider a unique policy in its dealings with Japan. 
Since World War Two New Zealand has maintained a close relationship with Japan and it 
has been one of the most important and beneficial relationships New Zealand has shared 
with any country. While the advantages of trade, cooperation and consultation have been 
more significant for New Zealand due to the disparities of size, influence and economic 
power, the Japanese still view this “strong, friendly, and co-operative bilateral relationship” 
as beneficial.4  
While the claim made in 1968 that “there is no country in Asia with which New Zealand has 
wider contacts than Japan”7 may have been true, and to an extent remained equally valid for 
many decades, it has also been clear from early relations that, “it is important not to disregard 
the very considerable differences of power and perspective between New Zealand and Japan 
                                                             
1 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Record (speeches), Vol. 8, No. 8 (February 2000), p.7. (accessed 
National Library of New Zealand). 
2 Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952 (London: Athlone Press Ltd, 1990), p.1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Fumio Kishida, “From one island nation to another - let's talk peace and prosperity,” The New Zealand 
Herald, 7/06/2013. 
7 MFAT NZ-Japanese Relations (Brief for Muldoon) August 31, 1968, 40/12/1. Quoted in Ann Trotter, 
“From Suspicion to Growing Partnership: New Zealand and Japan,” p.220. 
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nor the variations of objective that already exist, or may develop, between them.”8 Despite 
the presence of many common characteristics, these differences in interests and perspectives 
have caused friction and challenges in the otherwise strong partnership. 
These observations of New Zealand-Japan relations illustrate the reality of a strong yet 
strained relationship. The early economic contact between both countries built a foundation 
upon which further cultural and diplomatic ties were developed. Largely harmonious 
relations with regards to trade and security concerns have existed but tensions have arisen at 
various times since the 1950’s which arose primarily from moral and cultural differences. It 
is these differences which created a tense relationship at various points in the history of 
relations between both countries and caused the government to pursue policy choices that 
would minimise these differences to enable effective relations. 
1.2 New Zealand Identity in Extant literature 
Despite the increasing prominence of Constructivist scholarship and the role of identity in 
International Relations, few political scientists or historians have sought to understand New 
Zealand’s foreign policy using identity as an explanatory tool. As David Capie and Gerald 
McGhie state in Representing New Zealand: Identity, Diplomacy and the Making of Foreign 
Policy, literature on New Zealand’s foreign policy has been largely limited to historians and 
former diplomats.9 In their chapter, Capie and McGhie use the utility of identity as a means 
to understand New Zealand’s foreign relations, demonstrating the fluid nature of New 
Zealand’s self-identity and how specific national identities have played a role in foreign 
policy. Using case studies of the Pacific and the USSR the authors demonstrate that there is 
no single national identity which determines New Zealand’s foreign policy and relations 
with other states. The examples of the Pacific and the Soviet Union make apparent that New 
Zealand’s interactions with other countries are not shaped solely by the material factors of 
geography, size and resources. National interests are not ‘natural’ but rather are formed out 
of political processes which take into consideration what kind of country it is and ought to 
be as well as what New Zealand might gain or lose by certain interactions.10  
The authors identification of some key identities, including New Zealand’s identity being 
primarily shaped by its sense of itself as a small, geographically isolated ‘Western’ state that 
                                                             
8 MFAT: New Zealand Affairs External Relations Japan, General, Part 5 August 1, 1971 – May 31, 1972, 
58/12/1.   
9David Capie and Gerald McGhie “Representing New Zealand: Identity, Diplomacy and the Making of 
Foreign Policy,” in Teresia Teawia and James Liu (eds.), New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to 
Be (Victoria University of Wellington Press, Wellington, 2005), p.230. 
10 Ibid. p.238. 
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was closely linked to the United Kingdom, have influenced foreign policy and provide a 
valuable base on which to further explore national identity. 11  Capie and McGhie also 
highlight the attempts to link changing perceptions of identity to developments in foreign 
policy, pointing to Jock Phillips analysis of the rise in confidence of New Zealanders and 
how this contributed to an ‘emerging nationalism’ in the 1980’s and its influence on the 
breakdown of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).12 They 
also argue that there is no single ‘national identity’ which shapes foreign policy decisions 
and demonstrate how New Zealand’s sense of identity has evolved over the last seventy 
years and will continue to do so.13 
As mentioned, Capie and McGhie argue that there is no single ‘national identity’ which 
shapes New Zealand’s foreign policy decisions and this is demonstrated in the various 
national self-images which New Zealand has cultivated over the last century. This national 
identity is reflected in New Zealand’s perception of its international roles and relationships 
and its perception of other states. If identities are situational and dependent on the 
international context in which they are engaging, 14  this is especially applicable to New 
Zealand given it’s characteristics as a small, geographically isolated state. However, as Capie 
and McGhie demonstrate, “determining the identity of a state or nation or who is inside and 
outside a given community is an inherently political and contested process.”15  
While there has been little analysis of identity in New Zealand foreign policy, there has been 
a particular focus on New Zealand’s search for ‘independence’. Malcolm McKinnon’s 
Independence and Foreign Policy covers the period 1935-1991 and uses the concept of 
independence as a framework of analysis to look at how New Zealand’s early foreign 
relations were shaped by its affiliation with the Commonwealth. This caused foreign policy 
to be shaped by two overarching factors, “vigorous assertion of interest”16 and independence 
as “a form of dissent.”17 Assertion of interest is seen as an “independence” in decision 
making or a way of “speaking up” to pursue its own advancement despite the influence of 
other actors, first commonwealth countries and later United Nations (UN) member states. 
                                                             
11 Ibid. p.232. 
12 Jock Phillips ‘New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing national self-perceptions, 1945-88.’ In R. 
Baker (ed.), Australia, New Zealand and the United States: Internal Change and Alliance Relations in the 
ANZUS States (New York: Praeger, 1999). 
13 Capie and McGhie, New Zealand Identities: Belonging and Longing to Be, p.231. 
14 Ibid. p.232. 
15 Ibid. p.231 
16 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1993), p.7. 
17 Ibid. p.3. 
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The second form of independence, loyal dissent, is explained as "progressive critique of an 
existing patter, which did not, however, challenge its underlying structure.”18 McKinnon 
argues that both these forms of independence have become central to New Zealand’s foreign 
policy history. This analysis of foreign policy issues such as the nuclear issue, sport, race 
and the commonwealth influence contribute to the overall understanding of the role the 
concept of independence has played in New Zealand’s foreign policy tradition. However, 
McKinnon’s writing is primarily an historical account and he argues that “it did not seem to 
me that the evolution of identity explained foreign policy, even that it had much to do with 
it.”19  
In New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88, 
Jock Philips contributes to the literature on New Zealand’s identity by focusing on the 
disintegration of the ANZUS agreement with the United States as a result of New Zealand’s 
decision to deny entry to nuclear ships.20 Baker sees this period of New Zealand’s history as 
demonstrating the emergence of a “distinctive New Zealand national self-consciousness and 
a new vision of itself as Aoteroa, a Maori and South Pacific country and a moral exemplar 
to the world.”21 In Philip’s chapter he illustrates the considerable attitudinal change of New 
Zealanders prior to this period in history and discusses the significance of this to New 
Zealand’s relations with other countries. While a valuable contribution to the discussion of 
New Zealand national identity, Philips, like McKinnon, distances himself from the possible 
interpretation that his analysis of identity comes from a foreign policy perspective. 
According to Philips “history always seems to me to be about trade and capital flows and 
the detailed negotiations of very clever diplomats”22 and that his “perspective is not that of 
a foreign policy expert.”23 Notwithstanding the authors description of his chapter as an 
historical account and dismissal of it being a foreign policy analysis based in International 
Relations theory, his contribution to the literature on New Zealand national identity is a 
valuable foundation upon which to build further identity analysis. 
There have been few significant changes in the area of foreign policy with changes of 
political parties in government. James Headley and Andreas Reitzig argue that this is 
                                                             
18 Ibid. p.3. 
19 Ibid. p.xi. 
20 Jock Phillips, ‘New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing national self perceptions, 1945-88.’ 
21 Baker, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: Internal Change and Alliance Relations in the 
ANZUS States, p.134. 
22 Jock Phillips, ‘New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing national self perceptions, 1945-88,’ 
p.183. 
23 Ibid. p. 184 
11 
 
because “over the past three decades, an idea of New Zealand’s role in the world and its 
foreign policy orientation has emerged which the two parties share: adherence to free trade; 
close economic and defence relations with Australia; a focus on the South Pacific and the 
wider Asia-Pacific region; a commitment to multilateral and international intuitions such as 
the UN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Pacific Islands Forum; and the 
promotion of certain  principles, such as nuclear disarmament, human rights and 
democracy.”26 This bipartisan consensus on foreign policy reflects New Zealand’s identity 
which, while evolving, remains an identity that reflects the New Zealand situation as a 
whole. It is important to note that identity is “not a permanent and static possession” and that 
“the nation has from time to time be reinvented.”27 These shifting conceptions of national 
identity can be seen in the New Zealand-Japan relationship. Headley and Reitzig present a 
number of characteristics that potentially offer an insight into what constitutes the New 
Zealand national identity, “New Zealand can potentially be considered a member of the 
group of small states, of liberal democracies, of British settler societies or of South Pacific 
states. Gradually, the dominant conception has shifted from New Zealand being an outpost 
of the British Empire towards it becoming a fully independent state in the South Pacific.”28 
According to the authors, it is a mixture of these and other factors which create the dominant 
identity narratives which influence collective agents and individuals at many levels of policy 
and decision making. 
Furthermore, in The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New 
Zealand Political Discourse, Peter Skilling argues that New Zealand “faced the global from 
a unique historical, cultural and geo-economic position.”29 New Zealand’s late settlement as 
a nation and its geographic location and economic structure “has meant that the country has 
always had an identity constructed with one eye on global markets, investors and 
migrants.” 30  This is important in understanding how New Zealand’s various national 
identities have been influenced by its situation as a modern democracy with little economic 
influence. Without the hard power to pursue interests by military or economic might, 
international reputation is important. Values therefore play a significant role in driving New 
                                                             
26 James Headley and Andreas Reitzig, “Does foreign policy represent the views of the public? Assessing 
public and elite opinion on New Zealand’s foreign policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, 
no. 1 (2012), p.71. 
27 Keith Sinclair, A Destiny Apart (New Zealand: Allen & Unwin New Zealand Ltd, 1986), p.257. 
28 Headley and Reitzig, “Does foreign policy represent the views of the public? Assessing public and elite 
opinion on New Zealand’s foreign policy,” p.72. 
29 Peter Skilling, “The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New Zealand Political 
Discourse,” Australian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (2010), p.179. 
30 Ibid. p.180. 
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Zealand foreign policy and explains New Zealand’s emphasis on supporting international 
institutions and the system of rules based international behaviour in order to encourage 
global stability and to attain New Zealand interests. 31   If identities are situational and 
contextual as Capie and McGhie argue, New Zealand’s identity in the context of its 
relationship with Japan is particularly interesting, given both states simultaneous acceptance 
of being in Asia’s sphere while maintaining a distinct separateness. 
 
Finally, in Ethnicity, National Identity and ‘New Zealanders’, Donna Cormack and Carey 
Robson look at the relationship between ethnicity, citizenship and national identity. They 
argue that in colonial societies such as New Zealand, “understandings of ‘race’ and ethnicity 
intersect with conceptualisations of national identity in both formal and informal ways.”32 
The evolution of national identity in a settler context is the result of relations between 
“settlers, the Native Other and various other Others.”33 The authors argue that the creation 
of nations requires processes of inclusion and exclusion which is attained through the 
identification of difference, either formally through citizenship and immigration or informal 
processes. The authors see this marking of difference as fundamental to the development of 
relations between the white settler society and ‘natives’ in New Zealand, in addition to ‘non-
native Others’.34 They point to the discriminatory legislation that was apparent in the 19th 
and 20th century and aimed at Chinese and other ‘undesirable’ immigrants, highlighting the 
claim that “physical exclusion of Chinese from New Zealand, and by extension from the 
intellectual construct of ‘New Zealand’, was instrumental in the formation of New Zealand’s 
national identity.”35 Therefore, demarcating who was considered as belonging, and who was 
not, was necessary in creating a national identity. Ultimately, the authors argue that the 
marking of the ‘native Other’ as different, and the “exclusion of and discrimination against 
the ‘alien Other’” have been central to the production of New Zealand’s national identity.36 
Their work is a valuable contribution in understanding the construction of an identity within 
a society by looking at the role of ‘other’ in a domestic context. However, the role of identity 
                                                             
31 Terence O’Brien, “New Zealand foreign policy: the importance of reputation: Terence O’Brien reviews 
aspects of New Zealand approach to international affairs,” New Zealand International Review 38, no.5 
(2013).  
32 Donna Cormack and Carey Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’: considerations for 
monitoring Maori health and ethnic inequalities. Wellington: Te Ropu Rangahau Hauora a Eru Pomare 
(2010), p.2. Document accessed from www.ethnicity.maori.nz 
33 Ibid. p.2. 
34 According to the authors, ‘Other’ is used in this paper in its sociological sense to refer to “anyone and 
anything deemed capable of disrupting the social fabric and integrity of its imaginary identity: strangers, 
foreigners, intruders and so-called racial and ethnic minorities, for example.” 
35 Murphy N. “Joe Lum v. the Attorney General: the politics of exclusion” (2003). Quoted in Cormack and 
Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.2. 
36 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’, p.2. 
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in an international context is largely not addressed and leaves room for this to be considered 
further.  
 
New Zealand national identity has been analysed from various sociological, historical and 
political perspectives. These analyses all look at different aspects of New Zealand identity 
and do not come to any one conclusion, attributing significance to different factors.  There 
has been no one single, comprehensive study which has summarized and explained the New 
Zealand identity, nor is there likely to be. There has been little consideration of the role of 
identity in foreign policy; attempting to identify and discuss a unified national identity which 
has shaped New Zealand’s foreign affairs would be a difficult task. Authors have explicitly 
distanced themselves from their analyses of New Zealand identity being used to explain New 
Zealand’s foreign relations. However, the wide ranging sociological, historical and political 
discussions surrounding the New Zealand identity in scholarship and literature provide a 
strong foundation upon which to build an analysis of the New Zealand identity which is 
useful in understanding New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. The extent to which New 
Zealand values and norms relating to the country’s national identity and interests have been 
explored still leave room for a further discussion in general, and to New Zealand’s relations 
with Japan in particular. 
 
1.3 Japan and New Zealand Relations in Extant Literature 
Ann Trotter argues that following the Second World War, New Zealanders perceptions of 
Japan have developed with varying levels of “ignorance, interest, indifference and 
intensity”40 as a result of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan changing from enemy to 
key trading partner. Ann Trotter’s comprehensive account of New Zealand-Japan relations 
in the years following the Second World War, New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952, draws 
upon primary sources to examine New Zealand’s role and influence in the Far Eastern crime 
trials, in the Commonwealth Occupation Force and in the Peace Treaty debate. Trotter 
highlights that while New Zealanders “consciousness of Japan” was limited in that people 
were largely ignorant of Japan and its culture up until the 1940’s, New Zealanders had strong 
opinions regarding Asia in general. Japanese and Chinese were seen as undesired immigrants 
as an anti-Asiatic stance had “been characteristic of a lengthy period of New Zealand 
history.”41 Immigration policy around this time reflected the attitudes towards Asian nations 
                                                             
40 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952, p.1. 
41 Ibid. p.14. 
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that was based on a fear of the ‘yellow peril’ and a belief in the superiority of New Zealanders 
of British origin. Trotter points out that as late as 1954 the government’s stance on 
immigration policy was that “people whose stock originated in Britain shall always have the 
overwhelming predominance in the total people of New Zealand.”42 New Zealand and Japan 
1945-1952 gives a valuable account of the influence of New Zealand’s identity on its 
perception of Japan in the years immediately following World War Two, leaving room for 
further analysis of New Zealand’s changing perception of Japan and its people in the 
following decades. Ann Trotter has also contributed two more recent summaries of Japan-
New Zealand relations in volumes two and three of the New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs (NZIIA) publication series New Zealand in World Affairs. In “From 
Suspicion to Growing partnership: New Zealand and Japan” and “An Evolving Relationship: 
New Zealand and Japan” Trotter looks at the growing connections between the countries in 
addition to the disagreements from 1957 until 1990. She concludes, “It was clear in 1990 
that the Japanese market and Japanese culture would continue to present opportunities and 
to provide a challenge to the abilities, initiative and sensitivity of all New Zealanders in the 
decades to come.”43 
A comprehensive study of New Zealand-Japan relations up until the late 1990’s can be found 
in Roger Perens (ed.) Japan and New Zealand: 150 Years which follows the relationship 
from the minimal contact in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, through the war 
years up until the 1990’s. In particular the contributors highlight the considerable change in 
the period from the 1970’s to the 1990’s which saw contact and partnership between the two 
countries increase dramatically as a result of a number of factors, including the development 
of Asia-Pacific cooperation in the 1990’s. Apparent during this period is the establishment 
of associations including “state-to-state, business-to-business and people-to-people 
relations” 44  which is significant in that Japan was the first country outside the Anglo-
European sphere in which New Zealand forged these links. Peren states that while “the 
categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ remain a template which is resorted to when other 
explanations of phenomena are not to hand”, there are further developments in the 
relationship, “including a readiness to look on Japanese as people first and nationals of their 
                                                             
42 Quoted in Richard Thompson, Race Relations in New Zealand, Christchurch, 1963, p.15. In Trotter, New 
Zealand and Japan 1945-1952, p.14. 
43 Ann Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” New Zealand in World Affairs: 1972-
1990 Vol.3 (New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 1999), p.223. 
44 Roger Peren, Japan and New Zealand 150 Years (Tokyo: New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, 1999), 
p.20. 
15 
 
country second.” 45  Through an account of both Japan and New Zealand and the links 
between them at the time, the book recognises the mutual gains of a growing relationship 
and argues that it would be facilitated by an increased knowledge about Japan, including an 
improvement on the part of New Zealanders of the Japanese language. 
Significant additions to the literature surrounding New Zealand-Japan relations from the 
1950’s to the 1990’s include the comprehensive works of Marteen Wevers and Ian Kennedy, 
both former diplomatic representatives in the Japanese embassy who examine  the domestic 
and external changes Japan experienced during this time and the links formed between the 
two countries. In Japan Its Future and New Zealand, published by the Institute of Policy 
Studies in 1988, Wevers explores how in a relatively short period of time Japan became a 
country that was of huge significance for New Zealand, while highlighting the contrasts in 
history and the difficulty in contending with the considerable differences between the 
societies, cultures and traditions of both countries.46 Wevers is careful to highlight that while 
the structure of Japanese society demonstrates considerable differences from New Zealand 
at the time, the differences should not obscure the many similarities.47 He correctly predicted 
that the relationship between the two countries would not be limited to economic areas and 
views New Zealand and Japan’s increasing contact and ties as constructive, amicable and 
forward looking.48 Following this is Ian Kennedy’s Japan and New Zealand: Adding Value 
which does not attempt to replicate the detail covered in Wevers work but rather examines 
the changes that occurred both within Japan and internationally since 1988, particularly 
regarding the implications of these changes for New Zealand.49 Ultimately, these two works 
give an account of both Japan and New Zealand, while looking at the range and nature of 
the links that were apparent between them at the time and the means by which New Zealand 
may forge more links. These reports were not intended to be limited to economic and trade 
matters and it covers a wide range of links between the two countries. It does, however, leave 
room for the role and influence of identity in creating these associations to be explored. 
Perhaps the most recent overview of bilateral relations and potentially problematic 
disagreements is Andrew Sullivan’s Distant, Amicable and Enduring: The New Zealand 
Japan Relationship which argues that while the Japan-New Zealand relationship is beneficial 
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for both countries and has been long standing, it is also “largely asymmetric and indirect.”50 
Political interests are for the most part shared but the economic relationship is relatively 
asymmetric. Cultural ties are strong and the two countries are linked through third parties in 
official security relations. Sullivan sees a strong future in this relationship but highlights 
potential influences such as bilateral disputes, changing regional power structures and a 
weakening trade relationship. The two countries have been able to maintain these beneficial 
relations through shared regional interests such as trade, tourism and education which have 
facilitated growing cultural ties. Sullivan argues that relations between the two countries also 
has the potential to influence the role both countries play in Asian regional institutions and 
networks. Shared interests in the Asia Pacific region has led to Japan and New Zealand 
supporting the common interest of stability in the region. Japan’s political sway has been 
sought by New Zealand which has less influence in the Asia Pacific. Sullivan also argues 
that for the most part political ties are based on shared regional interests and trade, tourism 
and education. A strong trade relationship and cultural ties have been facilitated through 
exchanges, education and tourism. However, Sullivan highlights that some issues, such as 
agricultural trade liberalisation, transport of nuclear weapons, fisheries management and 
most significantly the diplomatic issue of whaling, need to be addressed so the future 
relationship of the two countries is not threatened.51 
 
While theoretical framework has not been utilised in any significant way to understand the 
New Zealand-Japan relationship, scholars and observers have presented general assumptions 
and conclusions regarding the relationship. Namely, that the relationship has been strong 
since its inception, and based on economic ties. There has also been recognition that a 
number of disputes have arisen despite this relatively close relationship. The literature 
surrounding foreign policy post World War Two has largely focused on economic relations 
and the importance of trade. While this aspect of the relationship is undeniably important, 
the significance of values and norms in shaping the diplomatic relationship, the economic 
relationship and the development of people-to-people relations remains largely unexamined. 
Questions such as why disputes and challenges have arisen, and why the relationship has 
still remained strong despite these difficulties have not been clearly answered. The strength 
of the relationship is often attributed to strong economic ties, but in some cases the 
difficulties that both countries encountered threatened to disrupt these trading associations. 
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These are questions that a general overview of relations in a historical or diplomatic sense 
fail to address fully.  While New Zealand’s perception of Japan and Japanese people has 
been explored to some extent in the time following World War Two until the 1990’s, the 
influence of identity on these attitudes has not been comprehensively explored, nor has it 
been applied to how they have shaped foreign relations with Japan. The last two decades 
have seen little interest in literature regarding changing perceptions and developing people 
to people relations or an examination of how this has affected foreign policy choices or 
stances concerning relations with Japan. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY  
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
An investigation of the literature on New Zealand’s relationship with Japan as well as New 
Zealand’s foreign relations in a general sense reveals that the role of ideational factors have 
not been comprehensively explored. Norms and identity appear to some extent within 
cultural studies but the role of identity in bilateral relations is not prominent. This thesis will 
utilise the International Relations 52  theory of Constructivism to explain the evolving 
relationship between New Zealand and Japan, in particular how values and norms have 
shaped New Zealand policies and diplomatic disputes with Japan. 
Constructivism first emerged as a paradigm in International Relations in the 1980’s as a 
challenge to the established dominant theory of Realism. Scholars such as Nicholas Onuf, 
Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein 
emphasized the social construction of international politics, therefore presenting 
Constructivism as an alternative to the traditional theories of analysing International 
Relations such as Realism and Liberalism. Rational IR theory has largely dismissed factors 
such as national identity and culture as relatively unimportant factors in determining state 
behaviour. Classical Realist theory, such as that discussed in the work of Han J 
Morgenthau,53 argues that states actions are designed to promote their interests in terms of 
power, and that the reasons for this behaviour can be found in human nature itself. In this 
sense, material power in the form of military or economic strength is the most significant 
influence in international relations. The foundation of such Realist approaches was the 
notion that the accumulation of relative power in an international structure of anarchy inform 
a states actions as a rational actor. 55  Expanding on Morgenthau’s Classical Realist 
assumptions, Kenneth Waltz advanced  Neorealism, or ‘structural’ Realism. This  moved the 
focus away from human nature and instead focussed on the structure of the international 
system. Neorealism isolates internal factors from external factors in the international system 
in order to focus on the structure and how individual states seek to survive in an anarchic 
system.56  
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Both Realism and Neorealism argue that internal and domestic factors, such as identity, are 
relatively insignificant in determining and explaining state interests. Liberalism and 
Neoliberalism maintain this approach. However, while Realist approaches explain how 
states pursue their interests through conflictual means, Classical Liberalism and 
Neoliberalism maintain that self-interest is the primary motivator for state actions but that 
these actions can be promoted via either conflict or cooperation and that interests need to be 
analysed in a broader way than just survival and security. Neoliberalism focuses on the 
significance of international institutions and organisations and looks at how states and other 
actors are able to achieve cooperation through the growth of international institutions.58 
Neoliberal scholars such as Robert Keohane developed models that, like Neorealism, view 
states as unitary and rational actors. Keohane argues that if conflict exists, the 
“institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in need of explanation.” 59 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism share a number of assumptions and aim to demonstrate that 
it is possible for rational actors to cooperate in an anarchical system.  However, Neoliberals 
consider states to focus on the absolute gains they receive from cooperation, while 
Neorealists assume that states will be concerned with the relative gains, or “how well the 
other states are doing as well as how it is doing.”60 Neorealism and Neoliberalism are clearly 
more aligned than Classical Realism and Liberalism. While the latter disagree on the 
“harmony or disharmony of interests” and the “importance or unimportance of domestic 
structures”, both Neoliberalism and Neorealism base their theoretical assumptions on “the 
facts of anarchy and of the rational egoism of states.”61 Therefore, Realism, Neorealism, 
Liberalism and Neoliberalism all maintain that rational interests are the starting point for an 
analysis of foreign policy.  
Constructivism does not disagree with the notion that states act according to their interests 
or that their behaviour can be either conflictual or cooperative, but asks various questions 
that traditional theories do not consider, such as how state interests are determined. In this 
sense, Constructivism assumes that interests are not given or part of ‘nature’ but are socially 
determined and constructed so that the international system is based on “the ways in which 
human beings think and interact with one another.”62  Rationalist theories are therefore 
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limited to an understanding of international politics based on static material assumptions and 
this fails to take into account the difference in interests which states exhibit in their 
interactions with other actors.  
Nicholas Onuf first introduced the term constructivism in World of Our Making (1989),63 
challenging the ascendency of rational choice approaches to International Relations. Onuf 
aimed to emphasise the importance of social relations and incorporate political character into 
IR theory. He argued that “social relations make or construct people--ourselves--into the 
kind of beings that we are.”65 In this sense, he posits that people “make the world what it is, 
from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and saying 
what we say to each other.”66 When Onuf first introduced this term it referred broadly to 
postposivitist approaches and he put forward the idea of Constructivism as a way of 
understanding social relations as opposed to a theory.67 Onuf’s ideas were later popularized 
and turned into an IR theory by Constructivists such as Wendt, which allowed 
Constructivism to gain more prominence as a theory. In 1992, Alexander Wendt challenged 
the dominance of rational approaches to IR theory in Anarchy is what States Make of it: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics.68 Wendt argued that the Realist and Neorealist notion 
of anarchy was not sufficient in explaining state interaction and behaviour. Wendt 
acknowledged the structural reality of anarchy in the international system but that it was 
individual actors which decided how to manage that anarchy, essentially that “anarchy is 
what states make of it”. He challenged  the Neorealist and Neoliberal emphasis given to 
materialism, by demonstrating that the underlying attributes of structure are not given by 
nature but are instead constructed by social practice. Without a ‘given’ nature of the 
identities and interests of the actors in the international system, behaviour cannot be 
explained by anarchy and therefore the Neorealist conception of ‘structure’ cannot explain 
a great deal, “it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize 
each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and 
so on.”70 If anarchy cannot explain the behaviour of actors then Neorealism’s emphasis on 
the material structure of the international system is illogical. 71  Wendt popularised the 
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Constructivist approach at a time when established IR theory could not sufficiently explain 
events following the end of the Cold War. Both Realism and Liberalism had failed to predict 
the events and could not clearly explain them, which contributed to legitimating 
Constructivist theories. Following the Cold War, the most significant issue was 
understanding how different groups perceived their identities and interests.72 The end of the 
Cold War allowed Constructivists such as Wendt to argue for the importance of social 
learning in IR theory and use the historical events to demonstrate the lack of ‘natural’ 
interests in world politics. Ultimately, traditional IR theories emphasize external factors in 
explaining international interactions and the perceived weaknesses of mainstream theoretical 
approaches led to an increasing emphasis on the domestic and social sources of foreign 
policy. Constructivism highlighted the relevance and influence of a state’s national 
characteristics on the states relations with other actors.  
However, there are many debates within the adherents to Constructivism in IR and it is 
problematic to view it as one single, homogenous theory. There are many strands within 
Constructivism and an understanding of these different divisions is important for an 
understanding of it as a theoretical framework as a whole. It is also necessary in order to 
identify the analytical framework which guides this thesis. The debates within the 
Constructivist school will first be outlined, followed by the central Constructivist tenets 
which form the foundation of it as a theory and distinguish it from traditional approaches. 
Finally, a discussion of the Constructivist approach that will form the analytical framework 
of this thesis will be presented. 
 
Perhaps the most commonly discussed division among constructivist approaches is the 
differentiation between the strands of critical and conventional Constructivism.85 Reus-Smit 
asserts that “constructivism is divided ... between those who remain cognizant of the critical 
origins and potentiality of their sociological explorations, and those who have embraced 
constructivism simply as an explanatory or interpretive tool.”86 In this sense, conventional 
Constructivism is viewed as occupying the middle ground between rational and post 
structural theories and is distinguished from its critical alternatives which include 
poststructuralism.87 Important in this distinction is the role of ontology and epistemology. 
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Constructivists disagree with the individualist ontology of rationalism which treats the 
individual as the central unit of analysis. Instead, Constructivism is based on a social 
ontology,89 “they emphasize how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and 
their interests.”90 Conventional Constructivists differ in ontology but do not diverge in any 
significant way from rational approaches on the issues of epistemology or methodology.91 
In this sense, while adopting an intersubjective ontology, conventional Constructivism 
accepts the assumptions of a positivist approach which includes hypothesis testing, causality 
and explanation.92 Ultimately, conventional Constructivists concentrate on a social ontology 
which differentiates them from mainstream IR theory, but they utilize a positivist 
epistemology.93 Critical Constructivists differ due to their focus on the role of critical social 
theory in Constructivism. They reject the positivist approach of conventional Constructivism 
and emphasize a postposivitist approach.94 Therefore, rather than focusing on how identities 
influence state behaviour, they seek to understand how these identities are socially 
constructed. This approach highlights discourse and linguistic methods and how language 
relates to the social construction of identities and interests and emphasizes the lack of 
empirical analysis in conventional Constructivism. 95  To summarize, conventional 
Constructivists aim to understand how identities are possible causes of action while critical 
Constructivism seeks to explore how these identities are created and “elaborate on how 
people come to believe in a single version of a naturalized truth.”96 
 
In The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, Ted Hopf outlines this 
relationship between the two strands by highlighting the features of critical social theory that 
constructivism has retained or developed. One area in which conventional and critical 
Constructivists diverge is the origins of identity. Hopf explains this difference, “conventional 
Constructivists accommodate a cognitive account for identity, or offer no account at all, 
critical Constructivists are more likely to see some form of alienation driving the need for 
identity.”98 In other words, conventional Constructivism identifies the existence of identities 
and seeks to understand their effects and articulate how those identities can indicate certain 
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actions, whereas critical Constructivists use critical social theory to further understand the 
origins of identity. The ‘critical’ school is prominent in Europe and is associated with 
concepts of norms and identity while the conventional approach is dominant in the United 
States and is seen to concentrate on ideas surrounding power and discourse. 99 
 
These two strands are discussed further in how they differ with regard to the importance 
given to the role of ‘difference’ in the construction of identity. Bahar Rumelili highlights the 
difference in these two schools of IR constructivism, labelling them liberal and critical 
Constructivism. 103   Liberal Constructivism is founded in the ideas of symbolic 
interactionism, in the sense that identities are formed through a process of socialisation in 
which an individual perceives themselves in the way others do. 104  Therefore, liberal 
Constructivism is focused on state socialisation. The social structure of international 
relations is established through norms, institutions, ideas and collective meanings and states 
“come to see themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted 
by the social structure of international politics.”105 If democracy is an identity that is socially 
constructed through the norms, ideas and collective meanings which define it, then states 
become ‘democratic’ only if these characteristics are recognised by other states. Critical 
Constructivism differs from liberal Constructivism by constituting identity in relation to 
difference. Rather than arguing for the existence of objective social structures, critical 
constructivism highlights that discourses on norms, ideas and collective meanings are 
understood in relation to what they oppose. For example, in order for democracy to be a 
recognised identity, it is necessary to presuppose an opposite identity, non-democracy.106 
Another way in which Constructivists differ in their approach to the theory concerns the 
level of analysis used. Constructivism has been categorised into the three divisions of 
systemic, unit level and holistic. Systemic constructivism concentrates on interactions 
between unitary state actors in the international system, as opposed to non-systemic factors 
such as domestic politics. While this approach acknowledges pre-social interests such as an 
interest in survival, it deemphasizes domestic sources of state identity like political culture 
in favour of the system wide structures in creating identities. The writings of Wendt 
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exemplifies this systemic constructivist approach.107 Unit level Constructivism differs by 
focusing on the role of domestic sources rather than systemic pressures in accounting for 
state identities an interests. According to Reus-Smit, this approach concentrates on “the 
relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of 
states”, with Katzenstein and Hopf utilizing this framework. 108  Finally, holistic 
Constructivism attempts to integrate both domestic and international structures to explain 
how state identities and interests are constituted. Martha Finnemore uses this approach in 
her work on how internationally driven identities can affect state identities.109 By looking at 
how the domestically created identities interact with the norms of international society, 
holistic Constructivism offers “a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and 
the international as two faces of a single social and political order.”110 This approach is 
apparent in the writings of John G. Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil. 
 
In addition to the differences between Constructivists concerning the level of analysis and 
ontology, Reus-Smit argues there are also different approaches regarding methodology. This 
distinction includes ‘positivist’ and interpretive or ‘postposivitist’ Constructivists. Positivist 
scholars focus on “uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and causal relationships 
between actors, norms, interests and identity.” 112  Interpretivist or “post positivist” use 
inductive research methods “that targets the reconstruction of state/agent identity, with the 
methods encompassing a variety of discourse-theoretic techniques.” 113  Conventional 
Constructivists are associated with positivism while interpretivist scholars are aligned to 
critical constructivism. 
 
While the differences in these strands of Constructivism are clear, they all recognize the role 
of identities, ideas and culture in International Relations. It is apparent that Constructivists 
have not “sung from a single hymn sheet” 118 but they converge in their critique of the static 
material arguments put forward by traditional IR theory. They emphasize social elements 
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and argue that there is no one single mind-set of ‘rationality’ within a state and that 
ideological causes such as different national identities with shared norms can explain the 
non-homogeneity of states actions and behaviour, rather than the external, material causes 
that Realism and Liberalism give importance to, such as security and trade. The main 
assumptions which challenge rationalist theories are as follows.  
First, Constructivists argue there is no one single objective reality. Traditional IR theory 
concentrates on identifying regularities and ways in which states are the same. 
Constructivism suggests difference in identities and interests emerge among all states as a 
result of social construction.120 
Constructivism highlights the social dimension of international relations and emphasize the 
significance of norms, beliefs, ideas, concepts, rules, languages and discourses. These social 
environments are constituted through differences among people and how they are influenced 
by collective social institutions.121 Actors do not function independently from these social 
environments, state interests develop from them and therefore shape the actors interaction 
with others in the international system.122 In other words, state interests are a reflection of 
state identities and these identities are shaped by norms and shared beliefs. These identities 
are not “fixed but relative and relational.”123 
 
Finally, the international system is viewed as socially constructed and not pre-given. As 
Onuf suggests, international relations is “a world of our making.” 124  Constructivists 
emphasize the role of interaction, with an international system that “is a set of ideas, a body 
of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time 
and place.”125 While actors may not be able to choose their circumstances, through the 
process of interaction with other actors, they make choices which “bring historically, 
culturally and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being.” 126 The material environment is still 
important, but states interpret it according their intersubjective beliefs. States do not react as 
rational individuals as traditional theories suggest but interact in a system which is socially 
constructed. 
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Identity can be defined in different ways. Peter Katzenstein define it as “images of 
individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor and formed (and 
modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others’.”128 This self-identity then 
shapes a states behaviour as the state attempts to act in a way that is consistent with a 
particular identity. 129  For example, according to Wendt, “it matters whether Europeans 
define themselves primarily in national or continental terms; whether Germany and Japan 
redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles; 
and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as ‘global policeman’.”130 The 
importance of the ‘other’ is another significant factor in a constructivist analysis, in the view 
of Adler and Barnett, “national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations 
and states… the identities of political actors are tied to those outside the boundaries of the 
community and the territory respectively.” 131  Wendt explores this idea that a states 
behaviour must be considered in relation to how it views itself with regards to other states, 
relations between states is therefore “an on-going process of states taking identities in 
relation in Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the 
result.”132  
 
2.2 The Significance of Constructivism in Understanding New Zealand-Japan Relations  
The above analysis of Constructivism as an International Relations theory will provide a 
framework with which to explore the role of identity in New Zealand foreign policy with 
Japan. Firstly, this thesis will use a holistic Constructivist approach. Domestic variables have 
informed a large part of New Zealand identity but this has been shaped by internationally 
driven identities in the form of external pressures and New Zealand’s involvement in 
international and regional organisations. New Zealand’s interests are based on domestic 
social discourses but this previously constructed identity is affected by interaction at the 
systemic level. The analytical framework is informed by a conventional Constructivist 
approach. Therefore, a deductive methodology will be utilized to examine causal 
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relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity. It will analyse the role of norms 
and identity in shaping New Zealand-Japan relations by using a social ontology without 
diverging in any significant way from rationalist approaches in terms of epistemology. The 
social structure of New Zealand’s relations with other states is formed through established 
norms, institutions, ideas and collective meanings. New Zealand sees itself and other states 
in terms of these factors and states recognise these factors in their interaction with New 
Zealand. The norms, values and ideas which inform New Zealand’s national identity are 
causes of action which can be used to understand New Zealand’s interaction with other 
states. The key traits which inform the New Zealand national identity as a whole will be 
identified and their role in shaping New Zealand’s foreign policy with Japan will be 
analysed.  
Constructivism as an IR theory provides a useful tool in understanding how specific 
identities are produced by domestic factors and how these identities then shape New 
Zealand’s interests and behaviour. The ways in which New Zealand views of Japan have 
been overwhelmingly influenced by its own domestic affairs and identity can be analysed 
using this framework of understanding. While ‘rational’ or ‘natural’ material interests such 
as trade, power and security are apparent in the relationship, they cannot sufficiently explain 
the development of Japan-New Zealand relations, nor the diplomatic interaction and 
challenges between both countries. A Rationalist approach would overlook the domestic 
political development of New Zealand and how this provides an understanding of foreign 
policy decisions that cannot be explained by materialism alone, such as the refusal of nuclear 
ships or the country’s emphasis on involvement in international organisations. 
 
While strong trading ties have created a foundation upon which the New Zealand-Japan 
relationship is built, identity has largely shaped this economic interaction. Rationalist 
theories offer little in the way of explaining the diplomatic difficulties New Zealand 
encountered in its dealings with Japan in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as the 
environmental disputes during this time. Although economic relations were strong, 
misunderstandings and challenges in communication and diplomatic interaction arose due 
to a difference in values which cannot be explained by material interests alone. New 
Zealand’s desire to engage with Japan on a closer and more personal level, and the policies 
initiated as a result of this, can also only be fully understood from the perspective of New 
Zealand’s evolving identity and the interaction of the various traits of this nat ional identity. 
For instance, New Zealand’s gradual move away from strong association with Britain and 
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the imperial, colonial values this represented to be being seen as an open, tolerate and 
socially liberal country with a multicultural identity. A difference in values also created 
conflict and tension in New Zealand’s relations with Japan over the issue of nuclear power 
in New Zealand and Japan’s scientific whaling programme. These disputes were driven not 
by material interest but by values, values which in fact threatened the material interests. By 
looking at significant aspects of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan during this time it is 
possible to analyse the extent to which these factors were influenced by New Zealand’s own 
self-identity. The significance of analysing key issues in the New Zealand-Japan 
relationship, and drawing conclusions on how the past relations have developed into the 
current relationship, offers insight to the evolutionary nature of the relationship and how this 
has reflected changes in New Zealand perceptions of Japan. 
  
29 
 
3 NEW ZEALAND IDENTITY  
3.1 Identity One: A Historically Cultural British Identity 
The identification by many authors of New Zealand’s sense of identity being primarily 
shaped by its sense of itself as a small, geographically isolated ‘Western’ state that is closely 
linked to that of the United Kingdom is useful. These factors have influenced foreign policy 
and provide a valuable base on which to further explore national identity.   
New Zealand’s colonial history and the outcome of World War Two has had a significant 
influence on New Zealand’s identity and foreign policy. Following World War Two New 
Zealand maintained a close relationship with Britain and the commonwealth due to various 
economic, political and sociological factors. Identifying largely with the characteristics of 
being a small, remote, rural and economically restricted country, New Zealand avoided the 
international politics and alliances which saw Australia become increasingly aligned with 
the United States.157 However, these self-identities arguably encouraged a “psychology of 
dependence” on powerful but distant states, initially Britain and then increasing with the 
United States.158 Many shared symbols and stories which formed the basis of a New Zealand 
national identity have been shaped by a sense of ‘Britishness’ which drew on imperialistic 
and colonial values. 159  The way in which New Zealand has maintained a sense of 
“Britishness” and the values both countries share is illustrated in the New Zealand 
Governments description of its ties with Britain: 
“The relationship between New Zealand and the UK has, since the earliest years, been based 
on complex trading and financial links, warm relations and a detailed understanding of each 
other and the way we do business. Our close ties have endured through times of prosperity 
and of hardship. We share many perceptions of the world at large. Our soldiers have fought 
side by side in two World Wars, and have worked together as peacekeepers around the globe. 
Commerce between us is facilitated by our shared language and history, our common legal 
and cultural backgrounds, making working together easy and congenial.” 160 
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These values which were derived from common cultural norms can offer explanations as to 
why New Zealand involved itself in Britain’s wars and why New Zealand has been described 
as a “reluctant nation”. New Zealand’s strong attachment to the UK created some reluctance 
to pursue an entirely independent policy in foreign relations.162 
 
In the early years of contact with Japan, New Zealand maintained strong symbolic and 
material ties with Europe. Cormack and Robson argue that “white settler” values and norms 
are reinforced through the institutional links, dominant language, the holidays that are 
celebrated and constitutional arrangements.163 The importance of loyalty to, and dependency 
on, Britain were values which were manifest in the early New Zealand national identity. 
From British settlement until the mid-twentieth century, New Zealand’s view of Britain as 
‘Home’ and the imperial values this entailed became the core of the country’s identity at the 
time. New Zealand’s foreign policy and military commitments reflected this loyalty to the 
British Empire, including the county’s involvement in the Boer War, and both World 
Wars. 164  New Zealand’s sacrifice in these conflicts demonstrated New Zealand’s 
commitment to the values and norms which Britain represented, such as liberal democracy, 
a commitment to a rules based international order an a free market economic system. These 
values underly the development of New Zealand’s democratic political culture and 
commitment to being a ‘good international citizen’, which will be explored later in the 
chapter. Another norm and value system upon which the “Britain of the South Seas” 
mentality was built was the belief in a form of racial hierarchy.  165  The ethnic composition 
of New Zealand was predominantly formed through immigration from the United Kingdom 
and many New Zealanders claimed to be ‘native-born Britons’, or ‘New Zealanders and 
Britons’. Sinclair points to a book entitled Nation Making. A Story of New Zealand Savagism 
v. Civilisation, in which a settler wrote that the “‘English race’ had been the pre-eminent 
‘Mother and Maker of Nations’ in modern times.”166 The settler population emphasised the 
idea of “superior stock” which was enabled through its ties with Britain.167 James Belich 
suggests that in early colonial New Zealand, the “game was to demonstrate New Zealand 
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distinctiveness, even qualitative though not quantitative superiority.” 168 The homogeneity 
which resulted from British immigration was accentuated, with the idea the New Zealand 
was “98.5 percent British” in order to market New Zealand as a desirable place for 
settlement. This led to the manipulation of statistics in order to conceal the numbers of other 
ethnic and racial groups such as the Irish and Chinese, and portray New Zealand as a “Better 
Britain.” 169  As James Belich and Lydia Wevers argue, a good way to find out “what 
countries think they are is by looking at who and what they try to keep out”, and for much 
of New Zealand’s history the country’s immigration policy reflected ethnic prejudices and 
the notion of maintaining a “Better British New Zealand, if not a wholly white one.”170 In 
the first half of the twentieth century New Zealand was described as  “Britain’s other farm” 
and the population was over 90 per cent European, principally of British origin.171 
 
Initially New Zealand was hesitant to join regional security agreements with non-Western 
states in the Asia Pacific region. One senior New Zealand diplomat held the view in 1949 
that “New Zealand does not look upon itself as an Asiatic Government but rather as an 
extension into the southern Pacific of Western Europe.”180 Following the Second World 
War, regional defence concerns arose as a result of the demise of the Chian Kai Chek 
government in China and the 1950 Korean War. As Capie and McGhie argue, New Zealand 
struggled with the notion of reconciling its identification of itself as a British or European 
nation with its role in the Pacific. It didn’t readily join regional security agreements with 
‘Asiatic’ states such as the Philippines.181 After the Second World War the British influence 
in the Asia Pacific region began to decline while links with the United States became 
increasingly significant, reaching a peak with the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Despite New 
Zealand’s growing relationship with the United States, its links with Britain did not 
diminish. 182  At this time, Walter Nash’s observation that “history has shaped New 
Zealanders into a people British in sentiment, tradition and economic interest”183 was still 
apparent but New Zealand was forced to contend with reconciling its sense of British and 
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European identity with its increasing prominence in the Pacific and Asia.  
In the decades following the Second World War, a growing number of factors began to 
influence this staunchly British influence on New Zealand’s identity. Baker’s interest in 
identity change, international relationships and the ‘national filter’s’ people of each country 
apply to relationships offers a further analysis of how New Zealand’s national identity has 
been shaped and how it is demonstrated. Jock Philips article, New Zealand and the ANZUS 
Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88, looks at the individual factors that 
have shaped New Zealand’s perceptions of the outside world and how this outlook has been 
influenced by consensus or internal differences.184 One of the most significant aspects of 
New Zealand’s identity which Phillips identifies is the easily observable, decreasing British 
involvement in the country, specifically news, television, films and books and therefore an 
easily observable rise in “a self-confident national culture.”185 It was clear in a 1974 brief 
for the visit of a Prime Minister of Japan to New Zealand that the country had  “taken a new 
look at [itself] in recent years.”186  Specifically, this different view of New Zealand’s place 
in the world could be attributed to the shift away from traditional ties with Britain and the 
end of the bipolar world.  
According to a 1974 brief for the visit to New Zealand of the Prime Minister of Japan, New 
Zealand saw itself as a South Pacific country with vital interests in East and South-East Asia. 
While New Zealand may not have been geographically part of Asia, the country was in 
Asia’s area of influence. The claim at this time was, “For a long time we saw Asia through 
other peoples eyes – first British eyes and then America eyes. Now we are consciously 
setting out to see things through our own eyes.”187 However, the report is careful to  point 
out that New Zealand was not about to part company with its ‘Western friends’, but instead 
create a more independent foreign policy by forging new associations which inevitably 
prompted a shift in balance and perspective.188 
The decline of British influence did not lead to New Zealand seeking a new overseas 
replacement, such as the United States, but rather a new focus on our own history and 
traditions. According to Phillips this came about as the population of New Zealand became 
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capable of generating its own norms, largely as a result of an increasingly highly educated 
workforce which allowed the country to engage more internationally and created a new 
social class.189 Phillips’s argument, therefore, is that “since World War II New Zealand has 
seen the emergence of a new social class, and this class has the self-confidence and 
intellectual training to start producing visions and goals for itself.”190 This gradual transition 
away from Britain’s sphere of influence will be discussed later in the chapter. 
It has also been suggested by Trotter that during the years following the war, New Zealanders 
thought in terms of the ‘tyranny of distance’ which disconnected them from ‘kin’ in other 
parts of the world. Therefore, the feeling of remoteness is argued as influencing the New 
Zealand psyche. Elements such as New Zealand’s bush, mountains and the surrounding 
ocean heightened New Zealand’s sense of being a remote nation and as a result of this, “of 
the peoples who lived on its rim and inhabited its small islands to their north, the average 
New Zealander knew very little.”191 This feeling of remoteness and isolation would have 
arguably contributed to New Zealand realisation that it was far from Europe and instead was 
surrounded by Asian and Pacific nations with different values and norms than Britain. 
The identity discussed above, which was formed through New Zealand’s historical and 
cultural ties with Britain, was most apparent during the early years of contact with Japan. 
However, the colonial and ‘British’ values and norms which had shaped the New Zealand 
identity up to this point would come to have less significance as the emergence of a strong, 
Asia Pacific identity became prominent in New Zealand society.  
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3.2 Identity Two: Construction of an Asian Pacific Identity 
Demographic changes in the last three decades have begun to redefine what constitutes being 
a New Zealander and the country’s place in the Asia Pacific region. It has also raised the 
need to re-evaluate New Zealand’s national identity and the increasing role that ties with 
Asia have had in redefining New Zealand’s self-image as presented externally. While a 
burgeoning Asian identity can be found almost since the establishment of ties with Japan, 
New Zealand’s Asian identity was established in a tangible way during the major debates 
which led to the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in 
Auckland in 1999.192 Since then, New Zealand’s Asia Pacific identity has continued to 
develop in various spheres. The 2013 brochure for New Zealand’s bid for membership on 
the United Nations Security Council refers to the “distinct Asia-Pacific identity” New 
Zealand demonstrates and draws on this “multicultural, Asia-Pacific identity” as a 
strength. 193  During a speech to mark the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s twentieth 
anniversary in 2014 anniversary the foundation’s executive director, John McKinnon, made 
the following observation about the organisations formation:  
“It was established at one of those seminal moments, which seem to occur about every ten 
years or so, when New Zealand ‘discovers’ Asia. Or, put more correctly, when the political 
leaders of the time recognised that there was a gap between our interactions with Asia and 
our knowledge of it, and by ‘our’ they meant not just, or even mainly, the official community 
which engaged with Asia but the broader New Zealand world who were caught up in it, 
whether they knew it or not.”199 
Clearly, in the last decade New Zealand had begun to acknowledge the increasing role of 
Asia in its future and that improving knowledge and encouraging interaction with Asian 
nations would be beneficial. The thesis will take a close look at how New Zealand came to 
realise the emergence of this new identity and see the importance of reconciling existing 
national identities with that of a new Asian identity and the values this represented.  
By the 1960’s the New Zealand identity had begun to take on new dimensions. There was a 
move away from the British connection which had shaped New Zealand’s self-image and a 
stronger sense of an identity located in the South Pacific. Central to this developing Asia 
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Pacific identity was a growing emphasis on the value of diversity with the emergence of 
debates surrounding the issue of whether New Zealand was a bicultural or multicultural 
nation. A significant part of this was also if New Zealand was to perceive itself as an Asian 
nation, a Pacific state or a country that was still part of the United Kingdom.200 In the decades 
which followed the 1960’s there was a growing sense that New Zealand was an Asia Pacific 
nation and that this should be reflected in its foreign policy and relations with other countries. 
Part of this desire to be an Asia Pacific nation was the need to be embrace the idea of New 
Zealand as a multicultural society with ties to other regional states. This view of New 
Zealand as a multicultural society rested on the values of wanting to be viewed as tolerant 
and open with importance placed on social liberalism. This belief in the value of 
multiculturalism was illustrated in 2002 when Prime Minister Helen Clark described New 
Zealand as “a land where diversity is valued and reflected in our national identity.”201 
Changes in immigration policies from the 1980’s reflected a strong departure from early 
New Zealand values of based on a white settler society towards one which celebrated a 
socially liberal, open and tolerant society. This brought visible changes to the country’s 
demography and New Zealanders faced the challenge of reconciling a largely bicultural 
society with that of a multicultural society. Bruce Robert Vaughn highlights how changes in 
the constitutional and cultural position of Maori people in New Zealand being more 
incorporated into the national identity changed the country’s view of itself as a “small corner 
of England out in the Pacific.”203 New Zealand began to recognise and incorporate Maori 
identities which created a more inclusive national identity and allowed the country to 
increase links with the Pacific and Asia. According to Vaughn, “the demographics of New 
Zealand’s growing Māori, Pacific Islander and Asian populations will likely continue to 
influence New Zealand’s national identity.”204  
An understanding of New Zealand’s Asia Pacific identity and the values and norms this 
identity is centred on is important in order to understand New Zealand’s regional interests 
and approach to foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region. Due to the increasing sense of New 
Zealand as an Asian Pacific nation, there is a norm that New Zealand will involve itself and 
play a constructive role in regional concerns. This expectation of involvement and values 
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based in New Zealand as a multicultural and involved neighbour in the region has influenced, 
and will continue to influence, the country’s future engagement in the region. 
A Pacific Identity 
In looking at New Zealanders perceptions of themselves around the time of the Second 
World War, Trotter argues that the growth of New Zealand’s ‘Pacific consciousness’ and 
the country’s identification of itself as a Pacific nation were a significant part of “a more 
confident late twentieth-century New Zealand nationalism.” 206 However, this psychological 
realisation of the country as a Pacific nation was a slow and gradual one. It was not until the 
breakdown of ANZUS and Britain entering the European Common Market in the 1970s that 
New Zealand began to embrace its role as a Pacific nation. There was a growing 
acknowledgement that New Zealand “took a long time to make up its mind that it was a 
Pacific country, not a European outpost.”207  
The development and manifestation of this identity has been apparent in many ways. New 
Zealand’s South Pacific identity is another aspect of self-perception which was developed 
largely in the decades following the fall of Singapore when New Zealand began to look to 
the Pacific Rim countries of Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States. While New 
Zealand may have increasingly looked geographically towards Asia, Western economic and 
political interests were still promoted and this was the foundation of the country’s 
involvement in Korea, Malaya, Singapore and Vietnam. Philips highlights this South Pacific 
identity as being significant as “it has strengthened a self-perception of New Zealand as 
another island of surf and sun, a paradise that should be protected from outside pollution.”209 
However, Trotter argues that the outbreak of war in the Pacific caused New Zealand to 
consider its geographical position in a way it had not before and how it would fit into this 
new perception of the region. It seemed to Trotter that New Zealanders did not see 
themselves specifically as a pacific nation and were susceptible to forgetting that New 
Zealand was a Pacific country in any way.210 
The evolution of New Zealand’s understanding of its role in the Pacific and as a Pacific 
nation is an integral part of its national identity. Its emergence was apparent as early as 1941, 
when A.J. Campbell of the Christchurch Teachers Training College made the observation 
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that, “The Pacific seems to be the part of the world of which New Zealanders know least and 
in which they are least interested. Perhaps it is because we think of ourselves in terms of 
Great Britain and not of ourselves as a Pacific power …. It is necessary to think deeply of 
the Pacific.”211 In 1944, the Listener asserted that New Zealand had been placed in the 
Pacific, not the Atlantic Ocean, and this was an important realisation to make. In the editorial 
titled ‘We belong to the Pacific’, it projected “Whether we realize it or not, like it or not, we 
have to find our place in a world occupied for centuries by tens of millions of Orientals.”212 
New Zealand’s relationship with Pacific nations has been a significant one that has 
demonstrated New Zealand values such as supporting security and prosperity in the region. 
It has demonstrated this support with diplomatic engagement in places such as Bougainville, 
Timor-Leste, and The Solomon Islands.213 A 2007 White Paper titled “Our Future with Asia” 
recognized four specific challenges which New Zealand needed to address, one of which 
was “Being a good neighbour”. 214  These values which New Zealand’s ‘rules based’, 
democratic identity dictates are apparent in the country’s 2010 White Paper which states:   
“It is in New Zealand’s interest to play a leadership role in the South Pacific for the 
foreseeable future, acting in concert with our South Pacific neighbours. A weak or unstable 
South Pacific region poses demographic, economic, criminal, and reputational risks to New 
Zealand ... It will remain in our interests for Pacific Island states to view New Zealand as a 
trusted member and friend of the Pacific community.”215  
 
While rational, material based interests no doubt come into play in New Zealand’s 
engagement with the Pacific, the country’s evolving national values with regards to the traits 
of a growing affinity with Asia-Pacific states, as well as New Zealand’s role as a ‘good 
neighbour’, have shaped these interactions. The weakening of governments and trade have 
caused New Zealand to become involved in the Pacific region, to prevent any adverse effects 
on New Zealand as well as to uphold ideals, demonstrating the relationship between rational 
interests and identity values.  
 
New Zealand’s origins as a country with Polynesian and Maori people, increasing 
immigration from Pacific nations, in addition to its geo-political position, has formed a 
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foundation of New Zealand’s identification as a Pacific nation. Official functions often 
involve traditional Maori customs and traditions and New Zealand has a Ministry of Pacific 
Island Affairs which supports the social, economic and culture development of Pacific 
people in New Zealand. Vaughn argues that while the country’s colonial ties to the United 
Kingdom once dominated the official view of New Zealand’s national identity, there was 
increasing “political space” for other traits to contribute to shaping New Zealand’s self-
image and that this is a key aspect of the country’s evolving identity. 216   
 
An Asia Identity 
New Zealand’s developing self-perception as an Asian nation has contributed to shaping the 
country’s values in international affairs. An ‘independence of action’ has become a value in 
New Zealand foreign relations and has influenced New Zealand’s support for the UN, closer 
ties with the United States, and a Free Trade Agreement with China. This is in addition to 
its strong policies regarding climate change, the environment and nuclear issues.217 This is a 
clear indication of New Zealand’s move away from identifying with a foreign policy aligned 
with Britain to one which is centred on New Zealand having a constructive, strong and 
independent foreign policy approach to the Asia Pacific region.  
 
Andrew Butcher explores the idea of “demography, diaspora and diplomacy” as being 
connected.218  Butcher argues that New Zealand’s future engagement with Asia will be 
shaped by both the country’s geographical proximity to the area as well as New Zealand’s 
increasing Asian minority population. As demographic changes occur and the Asian 
population of New Zealand begin to involve themselves politically with both their country 
of origin and New Zealand this will, according to Butcher, “shape, in profound and yet 
undetermined ways, how New Zealand as a nation relates to the Asian region and its peoples 
within its own borders.”219 This growth in numbers and significance of New Zealand’s Asian 
population will therefore have a significant influence on New Zealand’s national identity 
and public policy. He argues it will present challenges such as “terrorism, natural disasters 
and self-inflicted troubles” as well as the opportunities it offers. As the number of New 
Zealanders who identify with an Asian identity will continue to grow over the coming 
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decades, which statistical projections suggest they will, Butcher argues that this will raise a 
number of questions regarding what a growing Asian-Pacific demographic will mean for 
New Zealand’s national identity and foreign policy. What connections they will have with 
other ethnic groups? What role might they play politically? How might they distinguish 
themselves and be distinguished by others from migrant populations from Asia? What about 
those who share Asian-Pacific ethnicities? Butcher contends these are significant questions 
for New Zealand’s future and are “unique to New Zealand’s history, central to New 
Zealand’s identity, crucial for the measure of New Zealand’s various ethnicities and 
necessary to both ask and answer to understand New Zealand’s place in the world.”220 
Another component in the development of an Asia Pacific identity is the relationship New 
Zealand has with other states in the region. Butcher raises the issue of how diplomatic 
challenges are presented as a result of New Zealand’s growing involvement in Asia, in terms 
of both New Zealand’s increasing Asian population and the growing numbers of New 
Zealanders living in Asia. He points to the diplomatic challenges New Zealand has faced 
with China as an example of this. The controversy leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games and the protests against human rights abuses as a situation in which New Zealand 
and China encountered conflict as a result of different values. Anti-China sentiment was 
again expressed in 2010 when negative feelings towards Asia221 were attributed to China’s 
interest in purchasing portions of the Crafar dairy farms. This anti-China rhetoric was 
expressed by the media and politicians as well as the general public. While the mainstream 
rhetoric was rarely explicitly race related, Butcher highlighted the “irony of this particular 
debate” by pointing to other significant financial interests among Australian and American 
investors in New Zealand’s agricultural sector and the lack of debate raised in opposition to 
investors from those nationalities acquiring New Zealand property. Butcher refers to the New 
Zealand Herald columnist Bernard Hickey who asked, “Why is it worse than, say, the 
Australian banks owning 91 percent of our financial system or an Australian retailer owning 
one of our two grocery chains, Progressive, or Australian media companies owning our three 
biggest media companies, APN, Fairfax and Mediaworks?”223 The role of ethnicity in the 
attitudes and perceptions New Zealanders hold towards Asia have played an important part 
of identity formation and are discussed in the following pages. 
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3.2.1 Current Attitudes Towards Asia and Japan – The Role of Ethnicity in Identity 
Formation 
In their studies of the intersections between ‘race’, ethnicity and nation in settler societies 
Cormack and Robson look at how official ethnic categories overlap with concepts of 
citizenship and nationality. 225  This will likely continue to have an influence on New 
Zealand’s national identity as a result of the country’s significant and increasing Asian 
minority population. As these Asian populations continue to participate in political ways 
with their countries of origin, and an increasing number of New Zealanders engage with 
Asia, Butcher argues these connections will shape how New Zealand relates to Asian 
countries and people.226  
 
A wide ranging account of New Zealand’s evolving perception of Asia and Asian peoples 
over the past decade can be found in the Asia New Zealand Foundation polls which have 
been undertaken since the late 1990’s. These were commissioned to look at New Zealand’s 
place in Asia and demonstrate the significant changes in demography that increasing Asian 
populations have had on the country. From a political and diplomatic perspective these 
reports provide a valuable contribution in understanding how New Zealand’s place in the 
Asia Pacific region is evolving and how this will affect New Zealand’s national identity as 
both New Zealand and other countries perceive it. This changing view of Asia offers an 
interesting and significant comparison to attitudes towards Japan and Asia in recent decades. 
The statistics reflect not only a growing belief in the importance of Asia to New Zealand’s 
future but also to a growing feeling of warmth to Asian immigrants and culture. However, it 
also suggests a common feeling that while Asia is important to the growth of the country, 
New Zealand is not considered by many to be part of Asia.230  
Since the first study in 1997, the majority of New Zealanders (between 70 percent and 80 
percent) have considered Asia as important to New Zealand’s future. Additionally, the 
average percentage of New Zealanders who regarded Asia as important or very important to 
New Zealand’s future increased from 70 percent between 1997 and 2000 to 77 percent 
between 2007 and 2011. This demonstrated a growing perception among New Zealanders 
of Asia’s importance during that time, from an already high level in the late 1990’s. 
Unsurprisingly, the studies reveal that New Zealanders have different perceptions towards 
                                                             
225 Cormack and Robson, Ethnicity, national identity and ‘New Zealanders’. 
226 Butcher, “Demography, diaspora and diplomacy: New Zealand’s Asian Challenges,” p.152. 
230 Asia New Zealand Foundation (2013). New Zealanders' Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples: 1997-
2011. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. 
41 
 
different Asian countries. The gradient in the “warmth” of feeling among New Zealanders 
is highest towards Japanese while lowering towards smaller South East Asian states, likely 
reflecting the differing levels of experience in, and knowledge of, the different countries.232   
While Japan may generate a higher percentage of feelings of ‘warmth’, when New 
Zealanders think about Asia they think first of China, followed by Japan. Therefore, 
perceptions of Asia are more indicative of perceptions of China but Japan nonetheless is 
viewed as a significant part of Asia. The importance of Japan likely reflects the strong 
economic ties the countries have shared and the shared tragedies of earthquakes in both Japan 
and New Zealand.233 This was consistent in the 2013 results which indicated that when New 
Zealanders thought of Asia they initially thought of China or Japan, with 60 percent 
mentioning China first and 13 percent mentioning Japan first.234 
A considerable change in attitude towards Asian immigration to New Zealand is also 
apparent. New Zealanders who rated Asian immigration to New Zealand as positive or very 
positive has been increasing over the last fifteen years. This demonstrates a significant 
increase in positive attitudes and a changing perception of Asian immigration. However, 
opinion polls revealed New Zealanders viewed the economic impacts of Asian immigration 
more positively than the social impacts. Statistics after 1997 also reported that a significant 
proportion of the New Zealand population held the view that the number of immigrants from 
Asia was too high.235 
In 1997, only 32 percent of New Zealanders viewed Asian immigration as positive, despite 
the benefits from trade and tourism between Asia and New Zealand. This can be interpreted 
as New Zealanders recognising the benefits of business with Asia and Asian tourists but not 
being happy with the idea of Asians immigrating permanently to New Zealand. A number 
of both positive and negative perceptions are held by New Zealanders towards Asian 
immigrants. There was a common perception that Asian immigrants were wealthy, and many 
viewed Asians as having a reputation for being “polite, courteous, quiet, obedient and well 
behaved.”236 There was also a sense of admiration for what New Zealanders perceived as 
“the Asian work ethic and commitment and their strong sense of honour – expressed in 
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honesty and loyalty among Asians.”237 However, there were also negative perceptions of 
many Asian immigrants apparent insularity and the “tendency of recent Asian immigrants 
to isolate themselves and stick together, choosing to speak their own language rather than 
English (in front of other New Zealanders), refusing to mix and generally acting as if they 
were not interested in becoming ‘integrated’.”238 A description of some New Zealanders of 
Asians as “cold”, “clinical” and “unspontaneous”, were qualities that New Zealanders would 
be forced to compete with and which could have a negative consequence for New Zealand’s 
relaxed, laid back culture. Concerns that Asian immigrants were buying large amounts of 
real estate and “invading” desirable areas of New Zealand cities was another factor in these 
negative perceptions. There was also the perception that highly motivated and competitive 
Asian immigrants were competing with (other) young New Zealanders for employment.239 
 
The studies also provided significant insight into New Zealanders belief that while they 
viewed it was important to develop strong cultural and economic ties with Asia there was a 
strong barrier to doing that in the form of a lack of cross-cultural understanding. In 2012, 84 
percent of New Zealanders believed that it was quite or very important that New Zealand 
developed cultural and economic ties with Asia. There were also clear ideas about how this 
could be achieved. Fifty seven percent believed that New Zealand needed to do more to 
assist young people in engaging confidently with Asia while fifty eight percent saw the 
importance of encouraging New Zealanders to better understand Asian cultures and 
traditions. These cultural barriers to understanding included New Zealanders knowledge of 
Asian people and cultures, Asian people’s understanding of New Zealand people and 
cultures, and communication barriers.240 
 
These studies demonstrate a growing recognition among New Zealanders of the importance 
of developing ties with Asia. The majority of New Zealand’s population view Asia as 
important to New Zealand’s future and believed that there were economic benefits to 
establishing a strong relationship with Asia. One of the significant perceived disadvantages 
of closer ties with Asia, was the “loss of identity and kiwiana”. The survey posits that the 
growing attitudes of ‘warmth’ towards Asian people could be attributed to the growing Asian 
populations in New Zealand. The survey attributes the increase since 2011 to the hosting of 
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the Rugby World Cup and the shared tragedies of the Christchurch and Japan earthquakes. 
The changing demography of New Zealand and the changing perceptions of New Zealanders 
towards Asia and people of Asian descent is likely to have a significant influence on the 
country’s emerging Asian identity. 
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3.3 Identity Three: New Zealand as a Moral Example 
Domestic influences through state society relations have seen the evolution of a nuclear free 
norm and a broader identity of an environmentally responsible, pacifist and strongly 
independent country. These norms have been a driving force in New Zealand’s foreign 
policy and bilateral relations with Japan throughout the twentieth century. Capie and McGhie 
highlight the attempts to link changing perceptions of identity to developments in foreign 
policy, pointing to Jock Phillips analysis of the rise in confidence of New Zealanders and 
how this contributed to an ‘emerging nationalism’ in the 1980’s and its influence on the 
breakdown of ANZUS.241  
While there has been little analysis of identity in New Zealand foreign policy, Malcolm 
McKinnon uses the concept of independence as a framework of analysis to look at how New 
Zealand’s early foreign relations were shaped by its affiliation with the Commonwealth. As 
previously outline, McKinnon argues that New Zealand’s ‘independent’ foreign policy has 
been shaped by two overarching factors “vigorous assertion of interest”242 and “a form of 
dissent.”243 McKinnon argues that both these forms of independence have become central to 
New Zealand’s foreign policy history. However, McKinnon’s writing is primarily an 
historical account and not based in International Relations or Political Science theory.  
Central to this search for independence is the notion of New Zealand being a moral example 
to the rest of the world. Jock Phillips argues this has a precedence in New Zealand’s history 
as a settler society. New Zealand presented itself as a utopia, or “Gods own country” in order 
to encourage immigration and “give validity to its place in world history.”244 As this “new 
world” that New Zealand offered was based largely on improved domestic conditions, New 
Zealand was set to the “social laboratory of the world” and reforms were implemented to 
protect New Zealand from the industrial and urban problems of the places the immigrants 
had left.245 However, instead of being a “social laboratory” New Zealand demonstrated its 
ability to be a moral example to other countries. It can be argued this idea of New Zealand 
adopting the role as a moral example complements the small size of the country which has 
prevented New Zealand from having any meaningful influence through force or economic 
strength. While New Zealand may have been limited in its political and economic impact, it 
was possible for New Zealand to have a sense of influence by acting as an example for the 
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rest of the world. New Zealand was able to express its moral disagreement with the actions 
of other states by sending a frigate to Mururoa Atoll in 1973 and its opposition to the 1981 
Springbok Tour.246 At the time of New Zealand’s exclusion from ANZUS and the moral 
stand this represented, such actions were taken by the New Zealand government which 
reiterated this ‘moral’ leadership. The closure of the South African consulate and the 
imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa indicated New Zealand’s opposition 
to apartheid and was illustrative of New Zealand’s growing attention and sensitivity to 
morality in its international relations.247                   
Arguably the most renowned example of this “utopian moralism”, which Philips refers to, 
was the country’s non-nuclear policy which refused entry to nuclear ships. In ‘New Zealand 
and the ANZUS Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, 1945-88’ Jock Phillips 
explores the emergence of a “distinctive New Zealand national self-consciousness and a new 
vision of itself as Aoteroa, a Maori and South Pacific country and a moral exemplar to the 
world” which resulted from New Zealand’s stand in 1984 against allowing entry to nuclear 
ships.248 This “port call crisis” which saw New Zealand adopt a nuclear-free stance in 1984 
marked an important period in New Zealand history and demonstrated itself as an issue of 
national importance.  This “anti-nuclear” policy resulted in New Zealand being suspended 
from the ANZUS Treaty which had provided a foundation for the country’s security policy 
since 1951. In Phillip’s view, the decision to ban nuclear ships was founded on this emerging 
nationalism and not to do with any specific attitudes towards the United States.249 David 
Lange attempted to convey this by insisting that New Zealand’s position should be seen as 
“anti-nuclear” rather than “anti-American or anti-ANZUS.”250 While America had most 
prominently been negatively impacted by this stance, it sent a message to the international 
community and had a considerable influence in shaping New Zealand’s international 
reputation and identity in addition to influencing future foreign relations. The decision to 
award New Zealand a seat on the 1993-94 UN Security Council can be attributed to the 
international reputation the country had established as a result of its non-nuclear policy.251 
This wish to be seen as “independent’ emerged as early as 1969, when Norman Kirk was 
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asked whether New Zealand was to be satisfied with a ‘me too’ foreign policy, or “will we 
as a small nation take our courage in both hands…” 252  By 1984, it was clear that the 
emergence of a distinctive, outward-looking and independent foreign policy was a 
fundamental goal of the New Zealand government. New Zealand’s disagreement with the 
United States over the nuclear weapons issue clearly illustrated the country’s “desire for self-
determination in matters affecting our own destiny.”253 
While the loss of the security guarantee that ANZUS provided was undoubtedly significant, 
it perpetuated New Zealand’s self-image of an environmentally responsible, pacifist and 
intensely independent country. It clearly demonstrated how domestic influences shaped the 
emergence of a clear anti-nuclear movement, a strong sense of environmental responsibility 
and pacifism which would play a determining role in foreign policy. This, Baker argues, 
turned New Zealand’s considerable isolation into a role New Zealand had pride in. Rather 
than viewing the country’s isolation as having the potential to cause embarrassment and a 
feature that had to be compensated for, New Zealanders began to see it “as giving them an 
Olympian detachment from the world and a special duty to nudge the world in a peaceful 
direction.”254 It was a sense of nationalism that New Zealand had formed itself as opposed 
to an identity generated by our British roots and therefore all the more palpable. Norman 
Kirk propagated this identity for New Zealand in the 1970’s by presenting the country as a 
“progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity” and 
contributed to shaping the role of the country as one which was compatible with New 
Zealand’s strengths, essentially “being a good international citizen.”255                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
New Zealand’s gradual detachment from Britain’s cultural, political and economic influence 
allowed the country to create an independent and unique identity for itself which had an 
inevitable influence on its foreign relations with other states. In defining its identity, New 
Zealand incorporated the physical, cultural and political aspects of the country which made 
it distinctive. McKinnon’s  ideas relating to the forms of ‘independence’ which New Zealand 
gained over its history and Baker’s ‘moral utopianism’ which have been shaped by New 
Zealand’s isolation and small size provide a foundation on which to analyse the ways in 
which New Zealand’s identity have influenced its foreign relations and place in the world. 
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According to Phillips, “This awakening of Aoteroa to a new vision of itself has been the 
most challenging and exciting development of the last twenty years in New Zealand.”256 
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3.4 Identity Four: New Zealand as a Democratic, ‘Good International Citizen’ 
New Zealand has a national identity and political culture founded in democratic tradition 
and an open political system. An important aspect of this democratic identity is New 
Zealand’s strong commitment to multilateralism and international institutions and support 
of such principles as nuclear disarmament and the promotion of human rights. These 
principles were made apparent in a 2010 New Zealand Defence White Paper which defined 
the country’s national interests in the following way:260 
• A safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches 
• A rules-based international order which respects national sovereignty 
• A network of strong international linkages 
• A sound global economy underpinned by open trade routes 
 
These point to a values based national interest, with the report asserting that “a rules-based 
international order based on values sympathetic to New Zealand’s own,” is a priority in New 
Zealand’s national security interest.261 The values which are apparent in New Zealand as a 
democratic society include the importance New Zealand gives to humanitarian and 
developmental assistance in other countries, in particular the Asia Pacific region. New 
Zealand is also strongly involved in the United Nations and emphasises international peace 
and stability. This role as a ‘good international citizen’ and the values associated with it 
centre on the country’s promotion of a rules-based international order.262 
 
As outlined above, New Zealand’s identity emerged during the twentieth century as one 
which drew heavily on the values of a nation which was an extension of a Western, Atlantic 
centred English speaking world. As O’Brien argues, a notion of ‘Western-Enlightenment’ 
formed the foundation of this Atlantic worldview, “where secularism, rational thought and 
scientific achievement were conceived as basic values for human improvement.”263 These 
Western values, such as the spreading democracy to promote peace, were a significant part 
of shaping a Western, Democratic identity.264 It also placed New Zealand in the Western 
camp for both World Wars and New Zealand identified with the Western alliance during the 
Cold War. This idea of predictability and a rules based international order is based on the 
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commitment to following an international and multilateral approach with the promotion of 
international organisations like the United Nations. According to Terence O’Brien, this 
“confers legitimacy on international endeavour and provides a vast store of rules, principles 
and norms developed over half a century.”265 An important aspect for New Zealand of these 
norms is the value of seeking to be a ‘good international citizen’. New Zealand actively 
maintains this image with peace keeping and nation building involvement both regionally, 
such as Bougainville, Timor-Leste and The Solomon Islands, and further afield in Iraq and 
Bosnia. 266  O’Brien also points to New Zealand’s image as a modern, unthreatening 
democracy with “capacity for impartiality and evenhandedness” and “reconciliation 
established through the Waitangi process” as significant values upon which our democratic 
identity is based.267 Ultimately, the values and norms of democracy, good governance, the 
importance of international institutions, promotion of human rights and a belief in free 
market economies have shaped New Zealand’s image as a ‘good international citizen’ and 
identity as a liberally democratic, Western nation. 
4 IDENTITY IN NEW ZEALAND-JAPAN RELATIONS 
It is clear that there is no one, overarching factor which informs New Zealand’s national 
identity as a whole. The above identities have all played a role in shaping New Zealand 
relations with other countries. These traits are not fixed, but evolve and interact with each 
other which is demonstrated in an analysis of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan.  
The two countries share a wide range of interests and attitudes, including a high living 
standard, with a democratic form of government and an open society, a dependence on trade 
and a focus on encouraging regional cooperation.268 Both are island states disconnected 
physically from the continent of Asia which has meant an interest in regional involvement 
while maintaining some detachment. A further aspect of relations is both countries close 
cooperation and association with other countries such as the United States, Australia, 
Canada, The United Kingdom and some South East Asian states. While both states have a 
clear interest in how Asia is developing they are also concerned with their wider international 
interests and relationships. Japan’s declaration that its foreign policy is based on the 
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principles of support for the United Nations, close relations with the free world, and friendly 
ties with the countries of Asia are principles which New Zealand would undoubtedly also 
endorse.269 When Prime Minister Kirk was asked in 1973 about New Zealand’s general 
views on its relationship with Japan he replied he believed Japan to be affluent but that this 
affluence had given Japan the character of a nation in Asia but not of it, like New Zealand.270 
In this sense, Japan and New Zealand shared the common values and norms of a liberally 
democratic, free market economy. This also meant both nations were firmly with the 
Western alliance during the Cold War. New Zealand and Japan shared many common 
interests in the Asia Pacific region and both countries views align on many international 
issues. Despite the issues created by a difference in identity, with regards to the UN and 
many international organisations both nations “invariably find [themselves] on the same 
side, striving to achieve progress towards the same goals.”271 
While this has formed a foundation for the relationship, and arguably kept it as strong as it 
has been, New Zealand’s other identity traits have played a significant role in shaping 
relations. From the beginning of diplomatic contact following the Second World War, New 
Zealand has sought to engage with Japan and strengthen contact. Both interests and values 
have driven this increased interaction. These values and norms derive traditionally from 
areas other than Asia but as the relationship continues to grow, it is increasingly being shaped 
by identities which have their origins in many different domestic changes. 
As discussed previously, an overview of the literature on Japan-New Zealand demonstrates 
that there is little consideration of domestic social influences in shaping the bilateral 
relationship. While some identity theorising can be found in historical and cultural studies 
of relations between the two countries it has not led to the application of a national identity 
to foreign relations in any significant way. While New Zealand and Japan do share values 
drawn from their belief in democratic society and liberal international markets, other values 
have demonstrated a difference in interests in the bilateral relationship. These key 
differences can be attributed to a difference in history, language, and cultural experience. 
While the shared value in democracy and a liberal economy have created a basis upon which 
the countries have built a strong relationship, other conflicting values have been at the centre 
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of differences of opinion and these areas of value difference ultimately have an impact on 
policy. The influence of these identities on New Zealand’s relationship with Japan will be 
explored in the following chapters. 
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4.1 Early Contact: New Zealand Identity in Shaping Initial Bilateral Relations 
 
New Zealand’s early contact with Japan was shaped significantly by a strong historically 
and cultural British identity. The colonial values this represented were centred on keeping 
New Zealand as ethnically British as possible while viewing non British immigration with 
uncertainty.  While New Zealanders consciousness of Japan before the war was low, if not 
non-existent, increasing interaction with Japan and the role of Japan as the ‘enemy’ during 
the war contributed to reinforcing New Zealand’s culturally Western and ‘British’ identity. 
New Zealand had not yet discovered the significance of its place in the Pacific and there was 
a distinctive sense of New Zealand as a European nation which was distinct from the Asian 
nations it was surrounded by. An understanding of the attitudes and perceptions New 
Zealand held towards Japan, and the identity they represented, is necessary in order to 
understand how they would influence the relationship in early contact and in later decades. 
How New Zealand viewed Japan and Japanese people, and the influence of a British identity 
among New Zealanders on this perception, would shape early diplomatic contact with Japan. 
Before the war there was little evidence to suggest New Zealanders had any knowledge of 
Japan or its potential for influence in the Pacific. It was acknowledged that New Zealanders 
knew little, if anything, about Japan or its cultural identity. As one historian described, “New 
Zealand opinion about Japan has been a little uncertain, largely, no doubt, because of 
ignorance.”322 While in the late nineteenth century a very small number of New Zealanders 
visited Japan, they compared it with Europe and in their conclusions it was apparent they 
viewed it with a mix of “superiority, curiosity and banality.”323 Malcolm McKinnon presents 
the argument that this assumption of superiority was a result of the difference they 
recognised between Japan and Europe, with a perspective that the power relationship was 
considerably leaning in Britain’s favour. The New Zealanders that visited Japan were 
“affluent, educated and well-travelled” and they regarded Japanese as not demonstrating 
these characteristics.324 Early New Zealand travellers often perceived themselves as British, 
using British passports, while viewing the Empire as “ours’ and the other countries as 
foreign. According to McKinnon, these travellers to Japan, “made no distinction between 
being New Zealand and being British; they were both.”325 The different cultural norms and 
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language they encountered in Japan reinforced this belief of New Zealand as an extension of 
Britain and not an Asian state. 
Peren argues a significant part of New Zealand’s view of Japan and Japanese people, both 
before and in the immediate post war years, was Edward W. Said’s notion of 
“orientalism”. 326  In Orientalism, Said critiqued the “subtle and persistent Eurocentric 
prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their culture" which stemmed from the West’s 
inaccurate, exaggerated representation of Asian and Middle Eastern culture. When New 
Zealand did embark on a diplomatic relationship with Japan following the Second World 
War, New Zealanders perspectives on Japan were founded on what little they knew, as a 
predominantly European population, of the “Orient”. Accordingly, the “prism of 
‘Orientalism’” carried with it the expectation that Japan, like the rest of the ‘Orient’, would 
inevitably be different, unaccountable and inexplicable.” 327  The belief among many 
nineteenth century Europeans that the difference between east and west, and also European 
and non-European went beyond the obvious differences to the extent of the existence of 
superiority (European) and inferiority ( ‘Native’) which formed the basis of this orientalist 
view.328 Peren argues that the influence of ‘orientalism’ could remain regardless of whether 
the perception of Japanese people was positive or negative. When there was no threat, 
Japanese were viewed as “charming, quaint and picturesque”, but if they appeared to pose a 
threat they could be seen as “ill-educated and underdeveloped, hostile, aggressive, even less 
than human.”329 This ‘Orientalist’ perspective was a significant aspect of New Zealand’s 
relations with Japan in the decades after the Second World War. New Zealand’s foundation 
as an ethnically ‘British’ state informed this view of Japan as being different and a country 
with which New Zealand had little in common. 
While the average New Zealander had not been exposed to Japan or Japanese cultural norms 
there were clear general perceptions of Asians, or as they were described, ‘Asiatics’.330 At 
the top of the most undesired immigrant list were Chinese and Japanese immigrants who 
constituted the largest pre-war Asian community. Trotter argues that for a significant part of 
New Zealand’s history “bitter anti-Asiatic feeling” had been typical and that perceptions of 
Asia “were racist to a high degree.”331 According to McKinnon, “Japan’s rise was seen as 
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more threatening than that of the United States, its wartime military record more 
controversial than Germany’s and its foreign investment less acceptable than that of Britain, 
Australia or the United States.”332 A clear hierarchy emerged in which New Zealanders of 
British origin were placed at the top and those of Asian descent at the bottom due to a fear 
of the ‘yellow peril’ and feelings of racial superiority. These attitudes were apparent in 
immigration acts from the 1880’s.333 By 1941, New Zealand was still largely only familiar 
with Anglo-Saxon culture and ignorant of Japan. War breaking out perpetuated an already 
hostile attitude and Japan’s perceived undesirable racial and national characteristics were 
emphasised, reiterating New Zealanders already held prejudices against the Japanese.334 
McKinnon argues the soldiers visiting Japan appeared to have an “angels or demons” view, 
as their view towards Japanese people could change from demonising to romanticising 
them. 335  Arguably, the pre-war attitudes and perceptions towards Japan had not been 
completely altered by New Zealand’s involvement and experience in the war.336 Japan and 
Japanese people were often presented in an often false and exaggerated way which had the 
effect of strengthening New Zealand’s perception of Japan. Japan and its cultural identity 
was viewed as markedly distinct from New Zealand’s people and culture and supported the 
notion of New Zealand as a culturally British state. 
This identification of New Zealand as an ethnically British state with a wariness of Asia had 
a significant influence on shaping New Zealand’s relations and perceptions of Japan in the 
decade following World War Two, in which the first substantial contact was established 
between the two countries. At the end of World War Two, New Zealand’s perception of 
Japan was still influenced by ‘orientalism’ but the following decades would see the 
beginning of New Zealand developing an Asia Pacific identity. Immediately after the end of 
the Second World War, New Zealand struggled with maintaining its identity as a British 
state while realising its place in the Pacific.  
4.1.2 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
While the Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified in 1951, the fears and concerns of New 
Zealanders towards Japan were still strong. A 1952 publication titled “Must We Trust 
Japan?” from the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs reflected these fears.339 The 
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eight contributors make clear their concerns regarding the perceived inadequacies of the 
Treaty and “had New Zealand had an independent foreign policy” a different set of 
requirements would have been demanded.340 As Peren points out, New Zealand and Japan 
lie geographically to each other’s north and south but in all other respects the relationship 
was still distinguished by a culturally opposing east and west relationship. To New 
Zealanders at this time, Japan was still viewed primarily as an ‘eastern’, non-white, non-
European country. To Japan, New Zealand was plainly a ‘western’, European, British 
colony.341 Prejudice still remained after the war and as late as 1954 a Labour Department 
spokesperson made clear the prevailing view that immigration policy was to reflect the 
attitudes of the New Zealand public, in that ‘people whose stock originated in Britain shall 
always have the overwhelming predominance in the total people of New Zealand’.”342 These 
attitudes would shape initial contact with Japan. 
While both the government and the population of New Zealand held these concerns about 
Japan, this did not stop the New Zealand government establishing formal diplomatic 
relations with Japan in 1952. This was a significant move for the New Zealand government 
who at the time did not have a reputation for developing New Zealand’s representation 
overseas, particularly with regard to Asia and the Pacific.345 This was in part ideological in 
the sense that it was not an option to deny Japan’s necessity to trade as the contributors to 
Must We Trust Japan? make clear, “Japan must not be punished in a way as to prevent her 
earning a living.”346 Establishing diplomatic relations was also, as Trotter argues “to secure 
the convenience of a post in an area of acute diplomatic sensitivity at the time.”347 As the 
views in a NZIIA publication demonstrate, New Zealand by no measure completely trusted 
Japan or were unconcerned about possible future Japanese aggression and this desire to 
‘watch’ Japan was necessary.348  
It is also apparent that the New Zealand understanding of Japan and the Japanese evolved 
during the war due to personal contact and changing attitudes. During and immediately after 
the war, the Japanese were for many New Zealanders objects of hatred. However, in the 
decades following the war this perception underwent a significant change, with many New 
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Zealanders beginning to see the Japanese as people to respect and encourage friendly ties 
with. Notwithstanding this transformation in attitude towards the Japanese, the notion that 
Japan was fundamentally different to New Zealand would remain a significant aspect of New 
Zealand’s sense of identity with regards to its interactions with Japan. The collective image 
of Japan as an Asian people sharing little commonality with New Zealand was often the 
starting point in New Zealand policy makers and officials considerations of interactions and 
policies towards Japan. This would remain a factor in the Japan-New Zealand relationship 
for the following decades.  
In 1958 when New Zealand signed an economic agreement with Japan, New Zealand’s 
search for Asia Pacific neighbours was already apparent. This caused the New Zealand 
government to make a fundamental policy decision to strengthen the country’s contact with 
Japan in political, social, economic and cultural areas.354 New Zealand’s changing attitude 
towards Japan following the Second World War has been well documented. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAT) reports acknowledge the concern for New Zealand’s security from 
possible Japanese aggression in the early years after the war but this was influenced by New 
Zealand troops serving in the occupation forces and representatives appointed in order to 
express views on Japanese affairs.356 During this decade both countries made efforts to 
strengthen and broaden relations and contacts. There was an increase in official discussions, 
prime ministerial visits and diplomatic representation was raised to Embassy level. New 
Zealand supported Japans entry to the UN, friendship societies were established and in 1958 
both countries signed a Treaty of Commerce.357 
After the Second World War until the 1960’s Japan experienced a period of social reform 
which saw the introduction of democratic values by Allied countries including New Zealand. 
New Zealand and Japan shared these democratic and capitalist values and this formed a basis 
upon which the relationship could be developed. Due to growing personal contact in many 
areas in the twenty years following the war, the New Zealand perception of Japanese people 
changed from that of being the enemy to one of friendship and respect. As New Zealanders 
learned more about Japanese culture through contact, New Zealand as a whole created a 
foundation for improved bilateral relations. These changing perceptions of Japan had a 
significant influence on New Zealanders subsequent attitudes towards other states in Asia. 
The government made some efforts to change the ‘orientalist’ perspective such as 
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membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations. McKinnon argues the relationship between 
both countries had the most potential when New Zealand viewed the Japanese without “the 
blinkers of Orientalism, or otherness.”359 
According to Trotter, “The story of New Zealand’s relations with Japan since 1945 runs 
parallel with the story of New Zealand’s psychological and economic detachment from the 
United Kingdom. But in the period 1945 to 1952 this detachment was at most partial, 
foreshadowed rather than accepted.”360  The end of the Second World War marked the 
beginning of a shift for New Zealand away from Britain, in which Japan, the United States 
and the importance of the country’s place in the Pacific came to be recognised and 
acknowledged.361 
4.1.2 Conclusion 
The new establishment of diplomatic ties and the beginning of trade between both countries 
arguably marked a departure from the previous relationship. While it was a slow process, 
attitudes towards Japanese began to change and this was reflected in the evolving 
relationship over the next several decades. New Zealand progressed from viewing Japan first 
as a threat to having a greater understanding of the culture and tradition through increased 
contact with Japan and its people which ultimately resulted in better bilateral relations. Ann 
Trotter argues that this changing perceptions of Japan would have an important influence on 
New Zealanders perspective of Asia in the following decades.362 
This section has shown that New Zealand progressed from viewing Japan as the enemy to 
acknowledging the importance of establishing relations with the country, despite the 
difference in identities and perceptions of each other. These perceptions of animosity and 
ignorance of Japan changed over time to curiosity and a recognition of New Zealanders 
limited knowledge of Japan.  New Zealand’s identity as a Western, English-speaking, British 
state informed New Zealand’s perception of Japan as an Asian state which did not share a 
common history, cultural identity or language. This in turn made the government more aware 
of the potential to increase relations and New Zealanders understanding of Japan. The 
construction and evolution of a New Zealand-Asia Pacific identity would play a large role 
in New Zealand’s wish to pursue closer relations with Japan. This will be explored in the 
following section. 
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4.2 Cultural Identity  
 
The New Zealand-Japan relationship is clearly one characterized by size, with New Zealand 
as a small nation with limited resources and Japan a large and populous state with economic 
strength. Successive New Zealand governments have demonstrated the ability to maintain 
close relations with larger states, the strong alliances with Britain, Australia and the United 
States have illustrated this. However, as New Zealand and Japan’s relationship continued to 
grow and ties were increased, New Zealand was faced with difficulties and challenges it had 
not encountered with traditional partners. Japan differed markedly from these other nations 
in language, civilisation and cultural norms. Alexander MacLeod highlighted these 
challenges in 1972, “in its intercourse with Britain, the United States and Australia, New 
Zealand has been able to employ a common language and move confidently within a shared 
cultural tradition which, although there may be variations of accent, emphasis and style, 
enables the partners readily to assimilate each other’s thoughts and actions. In attempting to 
promote friendly and enduring relations with Japan, New Zealand is in no such advantageous 
position.”363 New Zealand and Japan did not just encounter a disparity in size, they faced 
‘in-built’ differences related to history, cultural identity and social patterns.364 
 
The sense of New Zealand as a geographically misplaced European nation gradually 
declined as a stronger Asia Pacific identity emerged which would shape relations with Japan 
in a new way. However, tensions relating to geography and different identities remained a 
part of New Zealand’s foreign policy with Japan. New Zealand was conscious of retaining 
strong ties with the ‘old world’ but an increasing identification as a multicultural nation of 
the Pacific with a duty to become more engaged regionally influenced the relationship 
between both countries and the economic foundation it was based on. Immersing itself in 
the Asia Pacific region required New Zealand to pursue policies and approaches that would 
allow it to forge new relationships in foreign environments. New Zealand had to reconcile 
traditional norms and customs with different ones which countries such as Japan presented 
them with. Japan represented a distinct and different culture which required a specific 
understanding and professional knowledge in order for the relationship to advance. While 
New Zealand did encounter misunderstandings and difficulties in its relationship with Japan 
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throughout much of its diplomatic and economic history, interactions were eased by the 
foundation of sharing liberally democratic values with a common belief in free market 
economics. As the influence of a European, British identity began to decline in New Zealand, 
and an Asia Pacific identity gained strength, the values of regional engagement and a desire 
to become more multicultural caused New Zealand to pursue policies to learn more about 
Asia, in particular Japan. 
 
It was clear as late as 1985 that while links were strong and trade was growing, New Zealand 
business elites and officials still did not have a strong understanding of Japan and that a 
difference in norms and customs was the source of some difficulty in the relationship. A 
speech to the Japan New Zealand Business Council Reception for the Japanese Prime 
Minister noted, “a relationship such as ours cannot thrive on business alone. What we see of 
Japan, we like. But we do not see enough of you. Japan’s importance to New Zealand is not 
going to diminish – if anything it will increase, yet we do not really know you very well. We 
need to get to know each other better.”366 New Zealand’s relations with other important 
countries at the time were largely founded and sustained by “common bonds of culture, 
family networks and shared history and traditions.”367 This was not found in the relationship 
with Japan but taking initiatives to become more familiar with Japan, both in the private and 
public sector, was made a priority. There had been some success as a result of cultural 
exchanges between the two countries which had been initiated to cover a wide range of 
interests and skills. These had enhanced the relationship by increasing the knowledge and 
understanding of each other which was made more difficult by not having a common 
language or cultural norms. 368 
Throughout the history of economic relations with Japan, Japan has been a significant, and 
at times the largest, trading partner to New Zealand. However, unlike New Zealand’s 
traditional trading partners of Australia, the United States and Britain, there is not the 
simplicity of a common language, history and cultural identity to easily facilitate contact and 
communication between the two countries. This is arguably changing as New Zealand looks 
increasingly to Asia, but for much of New Zealand’s history Japan has played a unique role 
is this regard. Japan was the first Asian country the New Zealand government was required 
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to initiate and encourage the development of educational and cultural ties in order to 
effectively pursue a strong economic relationship. New Zealand was lacking in the skills, 
expertise and knowledge of Japan to pursue the potential for economic growth that trade 
links would create. 
By the 1970’s it was apparent that the relationship between Japan and New Zealand had 
grown steadily with good relations and frequent visits at the leadership and official level. 
However, it was also apparent at this time that despite a strong basis in the relationship there 
was room for improvement in a number of fields. New Zealand and Japan had never shared 
a common cultural identity, historical experience or language and this resulted in people 
from both countries having a lack of knowledge about each other.  
4.2.1 Lack of Common Roots 
 
“Clearly New Zealand had no leverage with Japan. She had no constituency in Japan, no 
ties of sentiment or tradition. New Zealand’s politicians, diplomats and exporters were 
operating in what was for them a more difficult environment than any other important 
market. Furthermore the previous relatively sheltered experience of New Zealand exporters 
had not left them particularly well-equipped to perform in this environment. General 
ignorance of New Zealand in Japan was only to be expected.”369 
As Ann Trotter argues in this summary of relations between Japan and New Zealand, in the 
1960’s, New Zealand was set to face challenges in its dealings with Japan as a result of a 
lack of common understanding, language and culture. It was clear that New Zealand wanted 
to pursue stronger ties with Japan but this would be a more difficult task than its “cosy” 
relationship with countries like Britain and to develop these ties “would require vigour, 
sensitivity and imagination.”370 According to Trotter, “there was unlikely to be a dramatic 
breakthrough. New Zealand had to plan for the long haul.”371 
This was an important realisation for both the New Zealand government and public, and 
demonstrated how New Zealand identity as an English speaking, culturally Western nation 
would have a detrimental influence on shaping the country’s relations with Japan, unless 
changes were made to remedy this. While retaining a foundation in a culturally British 
identity, New Zealand’s self-image was evolving as it began to recognise its place in the 
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Pacific and the desire to become a more regionally engaged state gained traction. This had a 
noticeable influence on diplomatic and business relations in the early 1970’s and prompted 
both governments to encourage people-to-people programmes and to raise awareness of each 
other’s culture and achievements to ensure that different cultural and linguistic identities 
would not cause issues that could not be overcome.372 After a visit to Japan, Brian Talboys, 
then Minister of Agriculture, claimed “….the goodwill is there, but there is not much 
knowledge.”373 New Zealand clearly recognised the need to remedy this situation. 
A 1976 Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on the state of New Zealand relations with Japan 
reveals an uncertain, mixed assessment of progress in overcoming the challenges that 
emerged from the countries different identities. The report acknowledges the growing 
interest in Japan but is hesitant to claim any effective understanding of the country, “Interest 
in Japan among New Zealanders has grown rather fitfully and we are a long way yet from 
the sort of understanding of Japanese language, attitudes, culture, history and behaviour that 
we claim (not always correctly) to have instinctively of Britain, Australia and the United 
States.”374 Since the war there had been a growing curiosity among New Zealanders about 
Japan and this has led to attempts to emulate aspects of the Japanese culture, including 
Japanese arts, sports and pastimes as well as an increase in numbers of New Zealanders 
visiting Japan. However, there was the impression that the “overall picture ha[d] been 
patchy”.375 While there had been an increasing interest, New Zealanders in the political and 
academic fields had not yet developed a specialist interest in Japan, and media 
representatives stationed in Japan did not sustain an active interest in the country once they 
had left. Also expressed was the concern that the business community did not view the 
mastery of the Japanese language as an important attribute in its commercial conduct with 
Japan. The author of the report was under the impression that, “Japan has never held for New 
Zealanders the romantic appeal exerted by China”, and while conscious efforts had been 
made since the 1950’s to improve the relationship with Japan, there were still “some New 
Zealanders for whom old animosities and suspicions lie not far below the surface.” 376 
Accordingly, New Zealand required further initiatives in order to achieve “that degree of 
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informed awareness of Japan upon which a truly friendly and confident relationship must 
rest.”377 
A 1981 speech by Japanese Ambassador Takashi Oyamada reiterated the Japanese 
perception that New Zealand’s understanding of Japan was vastly different to that of their 
understanding of Europe. Oyamada acknowledged the growing trade relations and 
increasing frequent human contact and made clear that New Zealand must be “called upon 
to adjust to a new situation, one in which our knowledge and values must extend far beyond 
particular societies and national boundaries, and to understand not only the political or 
economic behaviour of Japan, but the ways of living, modes of thinking, in other words, the 
cultural make-up of the Japanese.”378 While New Zealand could claim an easy understanding 
of Europe, with it being “part of the mainstream of civilisation which flows so vigorously in 
New Zealand”,379 a knowledge and understanding of Japan and Japanese culture “belong to 
another heritage of human history.”380 It was clear to Oyamada, as arguably it was to many 
in New Zealand, that while New Zealand would undoubtedly retain strong ties with the 
United Kingdom being the source of much of the country’s cultural heritage, there was the 
realisation that stronger relations with Asia and the Pacific were inevitable.381 
While Oyamada makes clear he would not “fall into the trap” of drawing elaborate and 
artificial parallels between the situations of two countries, he does highlight the significance 
of the relative geographic proximity and strong economic ties between both states. He also 
draws attention to the common factor of enforced and self-induced isolation which may have 
influenced both countries perceptions of the Asia Pacific region. Like Japan’s experience 
with cultural and political isolation, New Zealand’s relations with the surrounding region 
had been influenced by its cultural and economic isolation in the physical sense and it’s near 
exclusive relationship with Britain. In both cases, Oyamada argues this inhibited progress in 
the development of relations with the surrounding region.382 
New Zealand’s limitations in size arguably made it more difficult for the government to 
pursue every opportunity and made it necessary for the government to build up the “limited 
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leverage that is naturally available to New Zealand.”383 According to a Ministry of Foreign 
Affair’s report it was possible, with a “concerted effort on the part of government 
departments in Wellington and our overseas posts” to greatly strengthen New Zealand’s 
general relations and in particular, its dealings with Japan. Realising the reality of New 
Zealand’s size, officials recognized that, “There is not much scope for the dramatic, but the 
cumulative effect of many small actions and activities that gradually build up the image of 
an intelligent, understanding, sometimes influential, and always reliable friend is likely to 
be more effective and long lasting.”384 
Differences in Language and Cultural Identity 
By the 1970’s the immediate post war perception many New Zealanders had about Japan 
had begun to change, largely due to increased knowledge and interaction. The ‘white settler’ 
values no longer formed the foundation of New Zealanders identity, due to a growing Asia 
Pacific identity which valued a commitment to multiculturalism and increased regional 
engagement. New Zealand no longer held the view of Japan it had following the war, partly 
due to a transition away from perceiving itself as a primarily European outpost in the Pacific 
to a view of it being an Asia Pacific nation with a duty to become engaged regionally and 
understand its Pacific neighbours more. Cultural and economic ties with Britain were 
gradually declining relative to what they had been and New Zealand was receptive to 
understanding Asia in a way that was different to initial perceptions of Asian nations, 
especially Japan. A 1971 description of Japan and its people celebrated the “complexity and 
delicacy of its civilisation, the infinite resource of its skilled and disciplined people, and the 
extraordinary partnership of industry, government, bureaucracy and labour that it can 
assemble in pursuit of its national goals.”385 Also apparent is the support of Japan’s liberal 
constitution, changes in the historic positon of the Emperor and a democratic government 
which pursued many forms of social change.386 Japan’s post war domestic strategies in terms 
of the reconstruction of the economy, the reestablishment of industry and the pursuit of trade 
are praised, with a work force described as being “conspicuously disciplined and loyal.”387 
New Zealand was clearly beginning to see Japan in a new way. However, New Zealand had 
not completely rejected its position as a ‘British’ state in the Pacific and some negative 
attitudes and difficulties still remained.  
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While it may have been true that “New Zealand has a Western society with a substantial 
Polynesian overlay” and Japan “an Asian society with a Western overlay”390, this Western 
influence was clearly not enough to facilitate an ease of contact and communication which 
New Zealand shared with other nations that had a foundation in a common identity. A 1971 
report highlighted some of the more significant challenges New Zealand officials faced when 
dealing with the Japanese. The report came to the conclusion that constant and close attention 
to the various difficulties were vital in order to “realise the potential of our relationship.”391 
According to the report the Japanese were “very self-centred” and it was important to 
demonstrate to them how New Zealand and Japanese interests coincided. This was due to 
the perception that there was no “natural New Zealand constituency” in Japan as New 
Zealand had with Australia, Britain, and to some extent the United States.392 It became clear 
in various reports that New Zealand was aware of more than a difference in language, there 
were also clear perceived differences in cultural norms and national character. These 
Ministry reports recounted that, “By history and temperament the Japanese were not easy 
mixers” and that “In any crisis, the Japanese tended to remain distinct and separate.”393 
However, despite these perceived cultural differences there was also the opinion that the 
governments of both countries had a predominantly warm and well developed 
relationship.394 
Even by the late 1990’s, it was acknowledged that one of the most significant challenges 
New Zealand faced in its dealings with Japan was that of language. From the start of trading 
relations in the 1960’s there was a limited number of businesspeople who spoke Japanese 
and even fewer had first-hand experience of Japan itself.395 In the early 1970’s, MacLeod 
noted that, “The complexities of Japanese culture and society, it is fair to say, are virtually a 
closed book to the mass of New Zealanders whose upbringing and education have been 
dominated for the most part of European concepts and whose perception of Asia is 
generalised and peripheral.”396  
The culture of business also differed greatly between the two countries. The perceived 
“rough and ready” style of New Zealanders demonstrated a marked difference from the more 
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formal Japanese traditions and tendencies. 397  MacLeod  points to the example of New 
Zealand businessmen who, after having contact with their Japanese counterparts, would 
‘express mystification’ at the close ties which were apparent in the Japanese commerce and 
government spheres. According to MacLeod , “This is only one instance of an inability to 
comprehend the Japanese way of doing things.”398 There was equal confusion on the part of 
the Japanese in understanding New Zealanders, not only linguistically but also in customs 
and attitudes. The difficulties encountered by the lack of Japanese speakers in New Zealand 
when Japanese officials, businessmen and private tourists visited New Zealand were 
compounded by differences in culture. MacLeod argues that the “beer, Rugby, racing” 
syndrome which was characteristic of New Zealand people and culture was difficult for 
foreigners, especially Japanese, to appreciate and led to “genuine points of difficulty.”399 For 
example, many Japanese businessmen had difficulty understanding why New Zealand would 
all but ‘close down’ for the period between Christmas until late January. This was clearly a 
custom Japan did not have experience with and many Japanese viewed this as a practice 
which inhibited commercial dealings.400 The challenge posed by this variance in attitudes 
and the language barrier was equally true at the political level and was exhibited in Japan’s 
contact with other states. These differences meant it was rare for any Head of Mission, other 
than the United States Ambassador, to interact with Japanese Ministers except in formal 
situation in which it was impossible to achieve any form of real communication.401  
 
Another issue raised in the contact with Japan at this time was the perceived difference in 
the Japanese “method of thinking”. A report from the New Zealand Atomic Energy 
Committee acknowledged the advantage of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language 
but held the opinion that it was of more importance to have an understanding of the Japanese 
“method of thinking”. In this respect it was perceived to be important to appreciate when 
they said “yes” what they more likely meant was “no” or “I don’t know” as a probable means 
to “save face” which was a situation the average New Zealander had not experienced.404 
There was also still an uncertain, confused image of Japan among the New Zealand public. 
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In the early 1980’s, one in three New Zealanders regarded Japan as either a ‘dictatorship’ or 
a ‘communist’ regime.405 Furthermore, in the political sphere, the Japanese bureaucratic 
structure made it difficult to facilitate the roundtable interdepartmental talks to which New 
Zealand officials were accustomed. In addition to this, New Zealand officials regarded 
Japanese government departments to be “highly independent, mutually suspicious and to 
lack coordination of overall policy towards other countries.”406 This meant good relations 
with Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gaimusho, did not necessarily equate to similar 
good relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Norinsho.407 
This sentiment of a significant but challenging relationship was again expressed in 1985 
when Prime Minister Nakasone visited New Zealand. The importance of New Zealand’s 
relationship with Japan was reiterated, having increased significantly since the early 1970’s. 
It was acknowledged during his visit that Japan was one of New Zealand’s largest trading 
partners despite not having the ease of contact or familiarity that New Zealand shared with 
countries like Australia, Britain and the United States. Despite efforts made in the previous 
decade to build up knowledge and expertise on Japan, much of the potential of the New 
Zealand-Japan relationship remained untapped. It was therefore viewed as important to 
continue to “encourage the development of educational and cultural ties between the two 
countries, to match the growth of economic links.”408 
Acknowledgement of Difficulties 
There was a noticeable disparity between the speed with which both countries were heading 
towards a strong political and economic relationship and the only just emerging mutual 
awareness among the general population. MacLeod believed, in 1972, that while economic 
profit may arise from such a narrow relationship, the potential for weakness could arise if 
the countries encountered difficulties and neither government could rely on a well-informed 
population. He viewed the relationship as lacking “a popular dimension almost entirely, and 
it should be a high priority of both governments to foster a basis of knowledge and mutual 
appreciation among the peoples on whose behalf policies are formulated and pursued.”409 
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When Prime Minister Kirk was asked in 1973 about New Zealand’s general views on its 
relationship with Japan he replied that it seemed to him that “Japan was at the crossroads.”410 
He believed Japan to be affluent but that this affluence had given Japan the character of a 
nation in Asia but not of it, like New Zealand.411 It was made apparent that the next decade 
would inevitably see a stronger relationship but one that would remain dominated by the 
disparities of the two countries. By the 1970’s it was clear that Japan would play a very 
important role for New Zealand but New Zealand would arguably remain of only peripheral 
importance to Japan. It would therefore be more difficult for New Zealand to reduce the 
significance of these differences. As a result of this respective disparity in power and 
influence there was a sense of New Zealand making efforts to encourage the growth and 
development of the relationship. It was important “by the use of our energies and our 
imagination, to build upon the sound foundations of the existing relationship” in order to 
make New Zealand’s judgement “reflect an understanding of Japan’s special interests and 
objectives.”412 
As a result of this, New Zealand government officials were of the view that the country had 
to make, and be seen to be making, a conscious effort to learn and understand more about 
Japan. The previous decade had seen the origins of such an approach, with exchange visits 
of a range of people and a growing interest in Japanese arts and methods, in particular the 
Japanese language. However, the report argued there was more to be done and the minimal 
amount of contact at to this point “merely exposes how much more remains if our image of 
Japan is to become more clearly defined if we are to achieve a better understanding of a 
people that is one of the most talented and complex on earth.”413 An important step to address 
what was seen a shortfall on New Zealand’s part to be able to interact and operate effectively 
in Asia was the establishment of the Asia New Zealand Foundation in 1994.414 
Officials began to be aware of the indirect effect on Japan of New Zealand’s relationship 
with Britain and Europe and of the importance of this in the respective perceptions of each 
other. Accordingly, it was viewed that New Zealand’s “dual identity as a Pacific nation and 
a projection of Europe”415 gave New Zealand a special status in Japanese eyes. It was clear 
New Zealand officials viewed this perception as beneficial, holding the belief that it was “a 
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kind of status that many of them have probably vaguely aspired to, and they envy the way it 
has come naturally to us.”416  Therefore, there was an advantage in strengthening New 
Zealand’s organic as well as cultural relations with Europe in order to improve the country’s 
relationship with Japan, such as full membership of OECD.417 Another area which was seen 
as a way to strengthen Japan’s perception of New Zealand was continued active involvement 
in the UN. Japan at this time placed a great deal of importance on the UN and the degree of 
prestige and involvement that New Zealand maintained in the various United Nations bodies 
was seen to give New Zealand some leverage with Japan and create a general sense of 
community. 418  New Zealand and Japan’s shared liberally democratic values and 
commitment to multilateralism was therefore seen to play a significant part in developing a 
strong New Zealand relationship with Japan. 
The acknowledgement of problems within the bilateral relationship were made clear in a 
1978 speech to the NZIIA, given by the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, Brian Talboys. 
He spoke of the “very complex issues” which were proving difficult to overcome due to a 
lack of common understanding between both countries. He highlights the belief that 
obstacles to communication between the countries should not be underestimated, 
acknowledging the significance of the difference in language and its usages as well as social 
customs. He was of the belief that the New Zealand government was “greatly disappointed 
that these problems remain unsolved.”420 However, over the preceding two decades and the 
differences that have arisen, both countries had come to a “more realistic assessment of each 
other.”421 In referencing Prime Minister Sato’s 1969 speech regarding the idea that the closer 
the countries came to each other, the more problems would naturally arise, Talboys 
highlights the need for both countries to talk openly about such issues before they become 
severe.  He claimed one thing was certain, “that is that New Zealanders and Japanese are 
now acquiring a considerably greater knowledge of each other and of each other’s society. 
That itself must lead to better understanding and so improve the relationship.”422  
The necessity for New Zealand politicians, officials and traders to learn how to manage its 
interactions with Japan involved an understanding of how to deal with considerably foreign 
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and unfamiliar procedures. 425  In 1976 this was acknowledged in a report on how to 
strengthen and expand the relationship between Japan and New Zealand, “No-one in New 
Zealand these days questions the importance of the relationship but we have not been easily 
persuaded that it needs to be considered special and to be pursued in a special way.”426 It 
reiterates the idea that New Zealand’s dealings with Japan were of equal importance to those 
with Britain, the United States and Australia but they were of a different nature and required 
a different approach. There was little similarity in New Zealand’s interaction and 
communication with Japan due to the lack of cultural and sentimental links that New Zealand 
naturally maintained with other Western states. Therefore it was only in Japan that New 
Zealand was “confronted with a major trading partner that differs profoundly from us in 
history, language, culture.”427 In cultural norms and values New Zealand maintained strong 
symbolic ties with the United Kingdom, even as New Zealand attitudes towards its role in 
the Asia Pacific region and its relationship with Japan were changing.  The ‘white settler’ 
values and norms, which included a loyalty to, and dependency on Britain still remained.428 
While New Zealand recognised the importance of developing stronger ties with Japan, New 
Zealand still maintained institutions and norms shaped by a sense of “Britishness” which 
drew on imperialistic and colonial values.429 The contact between the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand had been “facilitated by our shared language and history, our common legal 
and cultural backgrounds” which made the relationship “easy and congenial” but this shared 
sense of identity was not apparent in New Zealand’s dealings with Japan. 430 The lack of a 
common identity, other than that of a shared commitment to liberal democratic values, was 
a significant challenge and led the New Zealand government to implement policies which 
attempted to strengthen relations between the two countries and minimise these cultural and 
linguistic challenges. This was due to a growing sense that New Zealand was an Asia Pacific 
nation. An important aspect of this was the perception of New Zealand as a multicultural 
society which was actively engaged in understanding neighbouring countries. New 
Zealand’s relationship with Japan was an important aspect of New Zealand reconciling its 
existing identities, especially its sense of being a culturally British nation, with an emerging 
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Asian identity. These initiatives to build on and strengthen the already existing commonality 
of being democratic, free market countries are outlined in the following pages. 
4.2.2 Efforts to Build a Constituency 
The 1970’s marked a significant period in relations between both countries. While political 
and economic relations between the two countries grew in the 1970’s, people-to-people 
relations were not strong. Contact between people grew in the next twenty years, specifically 
in the areas of tourism and language but this failed to extend to the mass media. Central to 
the relationship developing was the necessity of both countries being able to communicate 
effectively despite significant language and cultural differences. A number of initiatives 
were introduced to build a constituency and understand one another’s culture which allowed 
for the growth of people-to-people relations.  
There was a strong recognition of the benefits of a stronger relationship between the two 
countries and it became apparent that in order to strengthen the relationship, New Zealand 
businessmen, politicians and the public had to become more effective when communicating 
with Japanese. As a result, Trotter states, the 1970’s and 1980’s were “marked by efforts in 
both the public and private sector in New Zealand of one another’s culture, build a 
constituency and broaden the basis of New Zealand’s contacts with Japan.”437 A number of 
organisations were established during this time in order to encourage a stronger 
understanding of Japan and Japanese culture among New Zealanders. These sporting, 
cultural and semi-official organisations helped to promote cultural links between the two 
countries. In 1976 the Japan Advisory Committee (JAC) was established to encourage a 
closer relationship with Japan and its people by increasing contact with people from the 
private sector, universities and government. This would lead to later initiatives in the 1970s 
and 1980s, such as the Japan New Zealand Business Council (JNZBC), Japan societies and 
Sister Cities.438 Exchange visits of both officials and school students contributed to changing 
stereotypes and introduced Japanese culture to New Zealanders who had previously had little 
or no contact with Japan. Ann Trotter argues that “by 1990 it could be claimed with some 
justification that, as a result of the work of these organisations, the average New Zealand 
citizen was now better informed about Japan and Japanese culture of which many had some 
direct experience in New Zealand or Japan.”439 
The New Zealand-Japan relationship relied on contact between political leaders, officials 
                                                             
437 Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.205. 
438 Ibid. p.218. 
439 Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.218. 
71 
 
and business people. These were reinforced through ties such as sister city associations, 
educational and research institutions and other ‘people-to-people’ exchanges. 440  The 
parliamentary exchange initiative of the Japan-New Zealand Diet members Friendship 
League was established in 1977 which aimed to endorse the significance of stronger bilateral 
relations with Japan among Members of Parliament in New Zealand. It was also designed to 
promote New Zealand’s connections with influential policy-makers in Japan in areas that 
would benefit New Zealand. The organisation received support in Japan and was largely 
effective in building a constituency in Japan. The initiative received further encouragement 
from the New Zealand government when the New Zealand and Japan Foundation was 
established to mark the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira. The Foundation, like the 
other initiatives, was designed to promote closer ties and a stronger understanding between 
the two countries. 442  The Japan New Zealand Foundation received funding from the 
Japanese government for cultural programmes and it spent approximately $250,000 each 
year on New Zealand related activities. Additionally, the Japanese Ministry of Education 
had a similar expenditure on scholarships for New Zealand students to study in Japan and 
every year a Japanese language teacher was despatched to New Zealand.443 
Exchange programmes were another initiative the New Zealand government pursued to raise 
awareness of Japan in New Zealand and improve the general understanding of Japanese 
society and culture in the population. These programmes were designed primarily for youth 
and introduced a number of educational and cultural exchanges after the government 
directed funding in 1974 towards the project. Most of the government funding for these 
programmes came from the Education Department and went to the development of Japanese 
teaching in New Zealand schools and tertiary institutions. 444  The New Zealand-Japan 
Working Holiday Scheme was another agreement between both countries that encouraged 
young adults to visit each other’s countries.445 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also funded 
the Special Japan Programme which was a visitor programme established in 1977 in order 
to encourage trade and economic links by bringing influential Japanese leaders to New 
Zealand.446  Roger Peren argues that it was these human exchanges that gave “the best 
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opportunities to ensure the real understanding necessary to confront any differences” and 
that “the exchanges touch more New Zealanders, and Japanese, than can be documented.”447 
These initiatives all had the same aim, to increase New Zealand’s understanding and 
knowledge of Japanese culture in order to strengthen relations with Japan and become more 
involved in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand recognised the limitations that a primarily 
Western focused foreign policy approach would present and took these steps to reconcile an 
identity founded on British primacy to one which engaged the Asia Pacific region.  
4.2.3 Education Initiatives and Economic Cooperation 
This desire to deepen its understanding and appreciation of Japan led to further education 
initiatives and policies to ease economic interaction. New Zealand’s growing perception of 
itself as an Asia Pacific state required it to increase its understanding and knowledge of other 
regional nations. The New Zealand government identified improving communication 
between Japan and New Zealand as an area which needed attention and as a result the 
Ministry of Education encouraged the teaching of Japanese in secondary schools in the mid-
1970’s. The study of the Japanese language had been introduced in the late 1960’s at the 
Universities of Auckland, Canterbury and Massey but as New Zealand increased its links 
with Japan, learning the Japanese language as a subject became increasingly popular. In 
1990 Victoria University of Wellington began offering Japanese language studies. Further 
progress was made in 1985 when the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone prompted Massey 
University to establish The New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies. It received funding 
from Japanese sources, Massey University and the New Zealand-Japan Foundation and 
sought to promote the significance of Japan for New Zealand and facilitate greater 
knowledge, understanding and expertise with regards to Japan.448 Part of this emphasis on 
educational and cultural exchanges was New Zealand’s strong involvement in the JET 
programme in which New Zealand graduates were hired to teach English in Japanese 
secondary schools. The programme proved to be successful in New Zealand and by 1990 
there were about 100 New Zealanders recruited under this programme.449 
However, by the late 1980’s, it was still argued that there was a lack of knowledge about 
each other, which according to Wevers, was a result of two factors, “the low priority given 
within the education systems of each country to teaching about the other, and the lack of 
                                                             
447 Roger Peren, “Toward greater understanding”. In Malcolm McKinnon, Historical Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, p. 20, Japan and New Zealand Historical Connections: proceedings of a colloquium held in 
Wellington, 20 February 1997. Wellington, New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, Massey University. 
448 Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.220. 
449 Ibid. 
73 
 
emphasis accorded by the local media and information services to Japan or New Zealand 
affairs.”450 
Studies by both Victoria and Otago Universities concluded in 1991 that: 
“Building a more Asia-literate society is a long-term task, in reality that of a whole 
generation. It requires a broad national consensus, the support of the wider community 
and leadership from government, business and the universities. It also requires 
pressure, not least from students and parents, and industry sectors like tourism, from 
whom the Asia market provides strong growth potential. There are some positive signs 
in New Zealand, but the issue has not been grasped here as wholeheartedly as it has 
been in Australia.”451 
“There is an imbalance between New Zealand’s growing connection with Asia-Pacific 
and the lack of Asian studies in the education system. Asia impinges upon New 
Zealand’s interests on a variety of fronts and will loom large in its concerns well into 
the foreseeable future. Teaching Asian studies is a necessary part of the process of 
redefining this country’s identity and attachments. The educational and cultural 
reasons for studying Asian languages and civilisations have been reinforced in recent 
times by compelling economic and political arguments …”452 
While not disagreeing with these statements, Kennedy highlights the considerable growth of 
public interest in Japan and how this had influenced the improvement of educational results. 
The study titled  ‘Japanese Language in New Zealand Secondary Schools’ by Terrence 
Aschoff demonstrated the significant increase in numbers of secondary schools which 
offered Japanese language study, from 100 in 1988 to 189 in 1991 (out of a total of 410 
schools). There was also an increase in numbers of students who passed stage III Japanese 
language at New Zealand universities. According to Kennedy, this “picture is one of 
considerable progress and commitment.”453 
When Japanese Prime Minister Ohira visited New Zealand in 1981 the concept of the Pacific 
Basin Community was being endorsed in both Japan and Australia, although New Zealand’s 
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view towards it was cautious. There was concern over a lack of possible participation among 
the smaller Pacific Island states and “New Zealand’s perception of itself as a spokesman for 
small states” meant New Zealand needed to address this issue.455 New Zealand took part in 
the 1980 conference which recommended setting up the Pacific Cooperation Committee and 
New Zealand and Japan became founding members of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (PECC) which involved the government, the private sector and academic 
representatives. According to Trotter, New Zealand’s support for an Asia Pacific community 
had increased by 1989 due to the growth and diversification of New Zealand’s trade in the 
region and the growing diplomatic relationships this resulted in.456 It was during this time 
that New Zealand began to make significant shifts away from historical ties with Europe and 
towards a role of importance in the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand’s trading issues with 
the European Union and the success of Closer Economic Relations (CER) with Australia 
prompted discussions of the potential for New Zealand to involve itself more in regional 
organisations. New Zealand supported the 1989 initiative for the establishment of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and saw Japan’s involvement in this forum as 
equally important. While some Southeast Asian states, such as Malaysia, did not perceive 
New Zealand and Australia as being entirely valid members of any potential Asian 
organisations, New Zealand none the less became part of a broad-Pacific group. Japan 
supported the creation of APEC and did not support the concept of an exclusively East Asian 
economic bloc. This contributed another political and economic layer to the New Zealand 
Japan relationship.457 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
By 1985 it was apparent that New Zealand’s relationship with Japan was the most important 
relationship New Zealand had with any Asian nation in terms of trade and diplomatic 
contact, which made it a partner as equally valuable as Australia, the United States and 
Britain.461 Largely as a result of the various policies to improve relations it was claimed that 
“In a host of areas, the Japan-New Zealand relationship is deeper than politics or trade or 
strategic interests. It is reaching new dimensions which we must track, and foster.”462 It was 
becoming increasingly apparent that New Zealand and Japan shared many common interests 
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in the Asia Pacific region and both countries views aligned on many international issues. 
Despite the issues created by a difference in identity, in the UN and many international 
organisations both nations “invariably find [themselves] on the same side, striving to achieve 
progress towards the same goals.”463 New Zealand and Japan built on this foundation of 
shared liberally democratic and free market values to develop the relationship, but in cultural 
norms and many values New Zealand remained close with the United Kingdom and an 
identity shaped by a sense of ‘Britishness’. While both New Zealand and Japan shared a 
commonality in their commitment to similar democratic and economic values, the lack of a 
common identity in history, culture and language was a significant challenge and led the 
New Zealand government to implement policies which attempted to strengthen relations 
between the two countries and minimise these cultural and linguistic challenges. New 
Zealand’s relationship with Japan was an important aspect of New Zealand reconciling its 
existing identities, especially its sense of being a culturally British nation, with an emerging 
Asian identity. Brian Lynch argues that during its history New Zealand had been faced with 
two options: “stand tall and seek to forge a new place in the world, or retreat into remote 
south Pacific irrelevance.”464 Arguably, New Zealand chose the former option and attempted 
to reconcile its small state, ‘British’ identity with one that engaged actively with other 
countries. As a result Lynch argues that New Zealand’s relationship “with much of the rest 
of the world has been transformed” and allowed New Zealand to become a “richly diverse, 
multicultural society.”465 
This chapter has reviewed the efforts and decisions the New Zealand government undertook 
in order to bridge the cultural and communication barriers which the countries different 
identities had presented. Unlike New Zealand’s strong relationships with other partners, New 
Zealand and Japan have never had a shared history, language or culture in which an overlap 
in identities would help ease interaction and prevent potential conflict. This difference in 
identities emerged as a potential challenge almost immediately after establishing diplomatic 
contact in the 1950’s and were a significant influence on the relationship over the following 
decades. There was steady progress in many areas and an increase in interest among New 
Zealanders in engaging more with Japan. A number of initiatives introduced by the New 
Zealand government to strengthen relations between the two countries attempted to minimise 
these cultural and linguistic challenges. New Zealand’s relationship with Japan played a 
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significant part in New Zealand reconciling its existing identities, namely that of a culturally 
British nation, with an emerging Asian identity. As New Zealand grew and expanded its 
international involvement, differences in culture and history presented themselves in contact 
with other states but not on the scale they had in Japan. Japan was one of New Zealand’s 
strongest trading partners and was arguably the first country which New Zealand was 
required to develop a large-scale strategy in order to address the differences and ensure these 
differences did not impede a strong relationship. The next chapter will analyse how a third 
major existing identity, that of New Zealand’s ‘moral’ identity would create tension and 
conflict in the Japan New Zealand relationship in the 1980’s and the decades after. 
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4.3 Environmental Issues 
In the 1980’s New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and environmental issues created tension 
between New Zealand and Japan and demonstrated a divide in common interest despite a 
close relationship. Ann Trotter highlights the idea that while both countries may share 
‘common interests internationally’, the importance of these issues and how they viewed them 
was different. 486  Relations between both countries had been growing steadily in the 
preceding decades but environmental points of contention demonstrated that there still 
remained areas in which both states disagreed and required careful communication. While 
both countries had active anti-nuclear and environmental lobbies, the influence given to the 
interests of these lobbies by their governments differed significantly. The Japanese 
government was sensitive to how New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policies could affect its 
relationship with the United States and was careful to distance itself from New Zealand at 
the time. The relationship was also strained in the late 1980’s due to New Zealand’s concern 
over driftnet fishing issues. The Japanese government publicised the issue and considered 
New Zealand to be sacrificing the relationship for domestic considerations. As a result of 
tension both countries took steps to re-affirm the relationship and political confidence with 
official visits of Prime Ministers and Ministers between the two countries. It prompted 
considerable political debate and affected New Zealand’s relations with Japan in addition to 
the change in relations with the United States.487  
New Zealand’s ongoing transition away from Britain’s cultural, political and economic 
influence allowed New Zealand to create an independent identity for itself which reflected 
values unique to the country. These new values and norms incorporated the physical, cultural 
and political aspects of the country which made it distinctive. This identity was shaped 
significantly by the growing sense of ‘independence’ and the notion of New Zealand as a 
‘moral utopia’ with a self-image as an environmentally responsible, pacifist and independent 
country. This anti-nuclear movement and a strong sense of environmental responsibility 
would have a strong influence on shaping New Zealand’s bilateral relationship with Japan 
when the issues of Japan’s whaling programme and the ramifications of New Zealand’s 
heavily anti-nuclear stance created difficulties in the relationship. 
4.3.1 Nuclear Issue 
New Zealand’s policy of prohibiting port visits by nuclear warships was one of the most 
significant foreign policy decisions in the country’s history and placed New Zealand in the 
                                                             
486 Trotter, “An Evolving Relationship: New Zealand and Japan,” p.216. 
487 Lynch “Dealing with the reality of small and distant,” pp.210-211. 
78 
 
international spotlight. The outcome of New Zealand’s exclusion from the ANZUS Treaty 
was clearly unfavourable but the government was committed to demonstrating such a strong 
stand by the force of party opinion.488 As the relationship between New Zealand and Japan 
had been growing over the previous two decades due to Prime Ministerial visits and annual 
talks, this made the tension created by the nuclear dispute between New Zealand and the 
United States considerably more concerning for the Japanese government. New Zealand’s 
close political and security relationship with the United States had played an important part 
in Japan’s perception of New Zealand, contributing to the importance Japan placed on its 
relationship with New Zealand despite the disparity in size and economic power.489 
Japan’s attitudes to nuclear issues have been unique and varying. For many years New 
Zealanders have commended Japan’s ‘nuclear allergy’ while arguably failing to take into 
account Japan’s heavy dependence on nuclear power.490 Japan relied heavily on nuclear 
power but there is a clearly adverse Japanese domestic public opinion to nuclear weapons.491 
During this time, visits of nuclear powered vessels to Japanese ports had not been an issue. 
However, Japanese policy regarding nuclear weapons was defined by the “three non-nuclear 
principles”, introduced in 1968, which state that Japan will not manufacture, possess or allow 
any nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan.492 While the Japanese government clearly 
enunciated these principles, the security relationship with the Japanese government attracted 
criticism by opposition parties at the time. When an opposition Member of Parliament 
brought up the issue of New Zealand’s stance on nuclear issues in the Japanese Diet, the 
Foreign Minister at the time, Mr Abe, replied:  
“I think Japan’s three non-nuclear principles are excellent principles. The New Zealand 
Labour Party has also been strongly asking that nuclear weapons not be brought in. On this 
point, they are exactly the same as us. I have not studied in details whether their policy has 
a form of three non-nuclear principles. However,… the Labour Party at least insisted on not 
letting nuclear armed ship visit New Zealand. Therefore, concerning this point, their request 
is the same as Japan’s …”493 
Both governments were aware of the significance of anti-nuclear lobbies but addressed them 
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very differently. The tension between New Zealand and the United States forced the 
Japanese government to look at their own domestic anti-nuclear lobby while trying to 
accommodate the conflicting demands of its security relationship with the United States, 
creating unsought friction. This caused Japan to distance itself from New Zealand and its 
anti-nuclear policies in order not to complicate relations with its strongest ally and trading 
partner.494 New Zealand’s relationship with the United States had been an important aspect 
of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan. The ANZUS Treaty reflected the fundamental 
interests and values that New Zealand, the United States and Australia had in common in the 
Pacific. Relations between these countries could be traced back through centuries. 
Ultimately, this meant that “The Treaty exist[ed] because of the historical, political, cultural 
security and personal links, not the other way around.”495 The ANZUS relationship had, up 
till this point, demonstrated the extent of trust, consultation and strong ties between New 
Zealand and the United States and this played a role in Japan viewing New Zealand in a 
positive light. Close relations with the United States also strengthened the idea of New 
Zealand as an advanced Pacific nation, which would make New Zealand a reliable player in 
the possible establishment of a Pacific Basin Community. 496 
Politically, at this time, changes in policy of both countries began to question previously 
aligning areas of mutual perception. Japan was concerned that New Zealand’s non-nuclear 
policies would weaken the United States-New Zealand relationship which would indirectly 
impact on the democratic coalition which all three countries were a part of and therefore 
weaken this close relationship. Uneasiness between the United States and New Zealand was 
worrying for Japan and signs began to emerge that “the normally placid atmosphere of 
Japanese/New Zealand communication had become somewhat clouded.”497 
Early discussions with Japan in 1975 regarding New Zealand’s concept for a nuclear free 
zone in the South Pacific revealed a difference of opinion on the nuclear issue. It was clear 
that New Zealand and Japan shared “a sense of urgency and danger about the nuclear arms 
race” and a common objective “of seeking to reduce the potential for nuclear conflict.”498 
However, the Japanese representative in the New Zealand Japan Official Talks explained 
that while Japan was, of course, a nuclear-free country it had no concept of a nuclear free 
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zone in its own territory. There was a “nuclear allergy” in Japan and anything to do with 
nuclear issues in the country had considerable political implications. Japan was under the 
“America nuclear umbrella” and the government was subject to both domestic and 
international considerations. However, the government had made clear that entry of nuclear 
weapons into Japan was unacceptable.499 
The nuclear issue was raised again in the mid-1980s. While there was an apparent 
discrepancy between Japan’s three non-nuclear principles and the US-Japan Security Treaty, 
the Japanese government took the stance that the United States respected its non-nuclear 
principles and in accordance with the Treaty would consult with Japan before it brought 
nuclear weapons into Japan. However, the United States maintained its policy of neither 
confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval vessels, a policy which 
New Zealand took significant issue with. Clearly, public opinion had manifested itself in 
New Zealand in a way it had not in Japan.500 The coyness and wish to avoid formal press 
conferences during Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to New Zealand in 1985 can be 
attributed to these differences in Japanese and New Zealand policies towards visits by United 
States naval vessels. The Prime Minister was “playing very much to his Japanese audience” 
and was therefore aware of the issue being placed in the spotlight of the Japanese public and 
opposition parties. There was an “extraordinary sensitivity of Japanese domestic public 
opinion to nuclear issues”501 that the Prime Minister was clearly aware of. It was apparent 
that one of the Japanese government’s fears was that if New Zealand established the 
precedent of refusing entry to American ships which it believed were nuclear-armed, “the 
pressure will be on Japan to do likewise.”502 
The Labour Government’s intention to exclude nuclear weapons from New Zealand was 
itself the reflection of a substantial movement of public opinion in New Zealand. Concern 
about the possibility of nuclear war and the desire to take some constructive action to control 
nuclear arms developed rapidly in New Zealand in the last decade, underlined by a growing 
awareness that the destructive potential of the nuclear power eliminated any possibility that 
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New Zealand might somehow escape the results of nuclear war. 503  A New Zealand 
representative acknowledged the New Zealand publics strong stance on the nuclear issue and 
said that there was a “great deal of misunderstanding on nuclear matters”, as “elements of 
the public were inclined to see all nuclear power as evil.”504  He believed the “nuclear 
allergy” was exacerbated by a number of things. Visits of nuclear ships, whether or not they 
were carrying nuclear weapons were unequivocally opposed. In addition to this, “a vocal 
section of the community contested the proposition that New Zealand needed nuclear power 
stations and felt that, even if they were necessary, the country should not have them.”505 
There was also strong opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and support 
for disarmament generally.506 
In discussions regarding the ANZUS/Nuclear Free Zone, the point was raised that “there 
were two schools of thought in New Zealand about our position in the world.”507  The 
traditional view perceived New Zealand as an integral part of the Western world and that it 
should be prepared to “accept without question the protection offered by the United States 
nuclear umbrella as a necessary deterrent.”508 The other view, while acknowledging that 
New Zealand was a member of the Western world, believed that the country’s situation was 
such that New Zealand should not have to rely on the United States nuclear umbrella, and 
that to do so could be dangerous. The report then made clear that “the present Government 
was seeking a course between the two schools. It was not prepared to take the latter view to 
its logical conclusions but, on the other hand, it had made it plain that it was not a party to 
the alliance at all costs and in all circumstances.”509 Evidently, the New Zealand government 
was more inclined to act in accordance with public opinion and willing to shape its stance 
on the nuclear issue with more regard to national identity than security concerns. 
In addition to the nuclear issue, in the late 1980s the New Zealand government became 
concerned about driftnet fishing by various other countries in the southern ocean. This 
method of fishing, which involved setting a long net to drift with the currents of the ocean, 
was seen in New Zealand as especially destructive. Tighter restrictions in the northern 
fishing waters had, however, forced vessels south. When agreement between the affected 
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coastal states and the distant water fishing nations could not be reached, New Zealand, to 
the irritation of the Japanese who considered New Zealand to be sacrificing bilateral relations 
for domestic political considerations, publicised and politicised the issue in an address by 
the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This 
move, in October 1989, was an effective ploy by New Zealand in its own interests and on 
behalf of small island nations. It was strongly supported by the United States. A UN 
resolution, of which New Zealand and the United States were the principal sponsors, 
provided for a moratorium on all driftnet fishing by 1992. Japan announced in July 1990 that 
it would comply by 1991. This was seen in New Zealand as a major concession and, in 
recognition of the fact that more frequent and better consultation between the two 
governments might have avoided or ameliorated the tension in the relationship caused by 
this issue, efforts were made to re-establish the relationship on a firm footing. Prime Minister 
Palmer revisited Japan in July 1990 and an agreement was reached for more frequent 
ministerial consultations and for the initiation of a number of projects in the environmental 
research area.510 
Ultimately, the environmental issues that became apparent in the 1980’s caused tension and 
the breakdown of the ANZUS Treaty placed considerable strain and uncertainty on the New 
Zealand-Japan relationship. The absence of Prime Ministerial visits to Japan in the 1980’s 
and Yasuhiro Nakasone’s 1995 visit as the only high ranking Japanese official between 1982 
and 1993 illustrated this unease.511 New Zealand’s strong aversion to any form of nuclear 
activity in the country and the subsequent difficulties this caused with the United Sates, in 
addition to other foreign relations like those with Japan, clearly expressed New Zealand’s 
“desire for self-determination in matters affecting our own destiny.”512 This affected New 
Zealand’s security arrangement and general diplomatic relations with other countries but 
demonstrated New Zealand’s identity as an environmentally responsible, pacifist and 
intensely independent country. It was a sense of identity formed through domestic influences 
and had not been shaped by New Zealand’s British roots 
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4.3.2 Whaling 
The issue which has put the most publicised strain on the relationship has been the ongoing 
disputes regarding Japan’s whaling programme. New Zealand’s strong sense of 
environmentalism and belief that commercial whaling is destructive has caused New 
Zealand to unequivocally condemn the Japanese whaling programme and the Japanese 
government for the role they have played in allowing it to continue. Within the otherwise 
cooperative and friendly framework the countries work in, Japan’s ongoing whaling in the 
Southern Ocean has created significant diplomatic disputes. In 1982 the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) issued a moratorium on commercial whaling but Japan 
continued its whaling programme. Japan maintained its whaling programme was in 
accordance with the International Whaling Commissions requirements due to scientific 
reasons. Japan argues that some whale species, such as the Minke whale are “abundant,” and 
that the “limited, sustainable use of such whale species does not pose any overall risk to 
stocks.”514 Additionally, the Japanese government claims that are a traditional aspect of 
Japanese culture “with links to artefacts, monuments, culinary history, art, literature, and 
festivals.”515 
New Zealand policy opposes all whaling and supports the absolute protection of whales, 
except under the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence Quota which permits some countries the use 
of traditional methods which abide by the commissions criteria.516 MFAT has given the 
following reason for the New Zealand government’s stance on whaling:  
“Even in relatively recent times, most great whale species were exploited to near-extinction 
by commercial whalers from many industrialised countries, including New Zealand. Whales 
have therefore come to symbolise the excesses of unrestrained human activity and their 
recovery is seen as an indication as to whether we can restrain ourselves for the benefit of 
future generations.”517  
New Zealand requires that a number of conditions must be met before it can support the 
resumption of commercial whaling; whale population numbers must recover significantly, 
and the issues of alternative uses of whales, health implications of consuming whale meat 
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and humane slaughter methods must be addressed.518 New Zealand has also demonstrated 
strong support for regional initiatives such as the establishment of a South Pacific Whale 
Sanctuary (SPWS) and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) 519  
Tensions over the whaling issue have become increasingly prominent over the last decade. 
In a statement in 2000, Foreign Minister Phil Goff stated that both countries would continue 
to have different viewpoints on the issue of whaling and that “The New Zealand Government 
and public remain unconvinced that Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary, undertaken in the name of scientific research, is necessary.”520 This somewhat 
subdued and unthreatening rhetoric gradually became more tense as Japan continued 
unabated its whaling programme over the following years. The Foreign Minister was clear 
to point out that “notwithstanding our differences over this issue” New Zealand and Japan 
would continue to maintain the friendly and cooperative relationship both countries have 
shared.521 
Public opinion on whaling in New Zealand has been strong and consistent, with many New 
Zealanders strongly against the IWC criteria which allows for limited catching for research 
purposes.522  New Zealand has joined numerous other countries in applying diplomatic 
pressure on Japan’s government to stop its whaling programme in the Southern Ocean. In 
2006, New Zealand’s view on the matter was made clear:  
“The New Zealand government is strongly opposed to Japan’s ‘scientific’ whaling 
programme. There is no scientific justification to use lethal methods to provide information 
on whale populations … Whales are iconic mammals which New Zealanders value highly. 
Of particular concern are plans by Japan to expand it lethal research programme to include 
catching and killing endangered humpback and fin whales.”523 
However, Japan has maintained the official line that it was operating legally and justified in 
its whaling programme due to cultural reasons. In 2010, the Foreign Minister, Katsya Okada, 
said that he did not see any need for a review of Japanese policy, “We have a tradition in 
Japan where we have been eating whale meat. It would be a different story if it were an 
endangered species… but, if not, I think the average Japanese would like to consume whale 
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meat into the future.”524 However, under the Democratic Party of Japan, which took power 
briefly in 2009, mixed messages emerged. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated he did not 
like whale meat and made a budget promise that included eliminating some of the subsidies 
and perks for retired bureaucrats that have influenced the continuation of whaling. The 
cultural importance of whaling is most prevalent among the elderly population of Japan and 
the “tradition of Showa nostalgia”, which is based on the symbolism of whale meat in times 
of war and hardship, plays a significant role in it. However, this is arguably changing among 
Japans younger population.525 These values and justification for whaling clearly clash with 
New Zealand’s stance on Japan’s whaling programme. 
Diplomatic tension escalated in 2000 when Prime Minister Helen Clark and senior Japanese 
officials publically condemned each other. Japan’s response to Foreign Affairs Minister Phil 
Goff’s letter on whaling was a suggestion to the New Zealand government to discontinue its 
support of Greenpeace’s anti-whaling campaign. In a letter to Fisheries Minister Pete 
Hodgson, the Japanese Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Tokuichiro Tamazawa 
advised that the New Zealand governments support for Greenpeace’s anti-whaling campaign 
could have a harmful influence on New Zealand’s image in Japan. According to Tamazawa, 
there was concern over “the prudence of a prime minister of a country, who publicly 
expresses support for Greenpeace, an international body known to be forcing its tenets on 
others by means of violent actions.”526 However, this diplomatic confrontation continued 
when Clark directed advice back to the Japanese Minister, “I’d advise him to stick to the 
issues and get the facts right. Greenpeace is not an organisation dedicated to violent protest. 
On the contrary, it is an organisation dedicated to nonviolent action, and it is an organisation 
which over the years New Zealand governments have had quite a lot to do with. So I think 
we will continue to deal with Japan on the substance of the issue and ignore the jibes.”527 
Clark appeared unperturbed about any impact this might have on New Zealand’s export trade 
with Japan, declaring that the protest came “from well down the pecking order” and she 
would have had more concern if the response had come from her Japanese counterpart rather 
than Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister. 528  Bringing to a close the heated 
diplomatic discussion, Shigeo Matsutomi, a counsellor at the Japanese embassy, disputed 
the Prime Minister opinion that it was a low level response, stating, “That’s her opinion. 
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This is a serious reaction. This is the official reaction of the Japanese Government.”529 
Following this exchange of rhetoric, in November 2000 there was further strain put on the 
diplomatic relations between both countries and both governments were “avoiding high level 
meetings lest they add to the friction.”530 Helen Clark described Japan’s whaling programme 
as “barbaric” and the Conservation Minister Sandra Lee made the assertion that protected 
whale species were ending up in Japanese fish markets. 531  The Japanese embassy first 
secretary Michio Iwanami described whaling as a big thorn in the side of diplomatic 
relations, and stated “scientific whaling is not commercial whaling in disguise, which is the 
criticism of the Government of New Zealand. Scientific whaling is truly scientific research, 
and we do hope for the cooperation and participation of New Zealand in that research.”532 
Another source of tension is the actual conflict which whaling activities that occur in waters 
near New Zealand have created. The involvement of Greenpeace vessels and ships like the 
Sea Shepherd in Japanese whaling activities has garnered much media attention. Relations 
became tense in 2006 when it was reported that the Japanese Fisheries Agency was 
considering involving the Maritime Police Agency to dispatch military aircraft,533 while 
some in New Zealand were in support of sending a frigate to observe the situation.534  In 
2010, New Zealand Foreign Minister, Murray McCully attempted to begin dialogue again 
after the sinking of the Sea Shepherd boat, the Ady Gil, in the Southern Ocean after a 
collision with a Japanese whaling vessel. According to the New Zealand Herald newspaper, 
it was due to “luck, rather than good management” that none of the six person crew were 
killed in the collision.535 The incident of a physical dispute created a significant turning point 
and arguably an event which had been building up over the preceding decade. While 
recognising that previous attempts at a solution had failed, he argued that “the diplomatic 
process is the only one that offers some prospect of significant success.”536 
 
The latest diplomatic dispute occurred in February 2014 when a vessel from a Japanese 
whaling fleet entered New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone. After the incident, Japan's 
ambassador in Wellington, Yasuaki Nogawa, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs and Trade where New Zealand’s concern was expressed by deputy secretary Gerard 
van Bohemen at the Japanese Whaling vessels decision to follow the protest vessel Steve 
Irwin into New Zealand’s Exclusive Econic Zone (EEZ). McCully stated the meeting was 
to communicate the “deep disappointment of the New Zealand Government that Japanese 
whalers had been insensitive to the views of New Zealanders by entering New Zealand's 
EEZ against our wishes.”537 He also reiterated that "While the Japanese whalers' decision to 
ignore New Zealand's strong wishes in this respect has no legal implications, clearly it was 
deeply disrespectful.”538 Labour's foreign affairs spokesman David Shearer also highlighted 
the diplomatic concerns, "The fact that the Japanese Government was aware, and appeared 
to sanction, the ship's entry into New Zealand's EEZ, when it knew of New Zealand's 
continued opposition to whaling is deeply concerning."539 The government had not ruled out 
further action of greater weight, such as requiring the Japanese Ambassador to meet with 
McCully as Foreign Affairs Minister which would put the diplomatic response on the same 
level as New Zealand’s response to French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the mid-
1990’s.540 
In March, 2014 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Japan’s scientific whaling 
programme in the Southern Ocean was for commercial rather than scientific purposes.541 
The ICJ provided Japan with “clear guidelines” for future whaling and what would be 
permitted as scientific. When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was questioned whether 
Japan would resume whaling in the Southern Ocean on a visit to New Zealand, he avoided 
the question and stated that Japan would abide by the ruling of the ICJ regarding its whaling 
programme. Key said that while Japan was investigating how it would be able to resume 
scientific whaling in accordance with the ICJ criteria, he expressed to Abe that New 
Zealanders had a “real concern” about whaling and that “New Zealand's view is there's no 
place for whaling scientific or otherwise.”542 Despite otherwise close relations, Key also 
made clear that both countries had different views when it came to the issue of whaling.543  
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Japan’s whaling programme has also highlighted a deviation from its traditional support of 
international institutions and multilateralism, a commonality New Zealand and Japan have 
largely shared as liberally democratic nations with vested interests in these norms. The issue 
of Japan’s alleged ‘vote buying’ and its contravention of the 2104 ICJ ruling regarding the 
illegality of its whaling fleet demonstrate this. 
The issue of Japan’s whaling programme created diplomatic tension with accusations at the 
IWC of Japanese ‘vote buying’.544 Evidence supporting this claim led the New Zealand 
government to declare its opposition to Japan’s action, with Prime Minister Helen Clark 
stating in a press release that “New Zealand and other countries opposed to whaling have 
long suspected that Japan was using overseas development aid money to persuade poorer 
nations, without any direct interest in whaling, to support Japan’s pro-whaling stance at the 
International Whaling Commission.” 545 In a speech to an IWC meeting, New Zealand’s 
Minister of Conservation, Sandra Lee, reiterated this position, stating that “[t]aking 
advantage of the poverty or vulnerability of developing countries and small island states to 
buy their votes can only be regarded as a serious misuse of power and influence by a wealthy 
nation,” and that “[i]t is disappointing that Japan is using such tactics as we have confidently 
worked alongside Japan in the United Nations and many other international for a.” 546 Vote-
purchasing heightened the severity of the situation and undermined values both Japan and 
New Zealand claim to share, such as the importance of democratic institutions while eroding 
trust and understanding. 
Despite a ICJ court ruling in March 2014 which ordered Japan to end its whaling programme 
in the Antarctic as it violated and international moratorium on commercial whaling, Japan 
announced it was making preparations to continue, maintaining the justification as scientific 
research purposes. While initially halting the activities of its whaling fleet after the ICJ 
ruling, the Japanese government announced it would proceed this year with a research 
programme in the Pacific, while making preparations for a trip to the Antarctic in 2015. This 
decision was supported by a large proportion of the Japanese public, with 60 percent of 
respondents in an Asahi Shimbun poll believing that research whaling should continue, and 
23 percent in support of ending the practice. Almost half of the respondents who were in 
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support of the whaling programme continuing did not eat whale meat,547 pointing perhaps to 
the prominence of a belief in whaling for traditional or cultural reasons. This refusal to 
adhere to international organisations, such as the IWC, marks a departure away from Japan’s 
commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based international order, values which have 
provided a foundation for its relationship with New Zealand. 
Japan and New Zealand have traditionally shared a belief in the value of a rules based 
international order and support of international institutions. However, the strain on the 
relationship due to New Zealand’s strong opposition to Japan’s whaling has deepened due 
to Japan’s alleged ‘vote buying’ and flouting of the ICJ’s decision which demonstrate a move 
away from the international norms that both countries had historically shared over recent 
decades. A resolute opposition to Japan’s whaling programme in the form of diplomatic 
censure and legal action demonstrate New Zealand’s distinctive sense of environmental 
nationalism and a belief in the value of protecting the environment both within the country 
and further afield. New Zealand’s small stature in economic and diplomatic influence has 
not deterred New Zealand from pursuing a foreign policy line which potentially threatens its 
strong relations with more powerful states, including the United States and Japan. This desire 
for an independent foreign policy that reflects New Zealand’s core values and beliefs and 
it’s self-image as a ‘moral’ leader has clearly contributed to shaping New Zealand’s stance 
towards many issues, in particular its active opposition to Japan’s whaling programme. 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
 
In the 1980’s New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and environmental issues created tension 
between New Zealand and Japan and demonstrated a divide in common interest despite a 
close relationship. Following this, Japan’s scientific whaling programme proved to put even 
greater strain on diplomatic relations between the two countries. The emergence of a distinct 
nationalism and its foundation in an evolving sense of being bound by a ‘moral’ identity and 
search for independence created a national self-image which shaped New Zealand policy 
towards Japan on numerous issues. A collective identity narrative created a nuclear free 
norm in the country and a sense of the nation as pacifist, environmentally aware and fiercely 
independent. This recurring conflict regarding matters founded on a sense of identity and 
value threatened to upset the trust and stability that Japan and New Zealand had shared for 
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much of their history. While difficult issues, ultimately these disagreements have been 
addressed in a way which has not escalated the conflict and both countries have continued 
to share a solid relationship. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
5.1 Current Relations 
Contact between New Zealand and Japan has evolved considerably in the last twenty years. 
Both states have ties in many areas and the development of Asia Pacific cooperation in the 
1990’s has influenced the relationship and given it new significance. There is now a variety 
of diplomatic, state and people-to people relations that have come about as a result of Japan 
being the first country outside the Anglo-European sphere that New Zealand has developed 
these numerous, globalised ties with. There is a growing tendency to view Japan’s citizens 
as people first and nationals of their country second. While there has been an upsurge of 
interest in Japan among New Zealanders, there has also been a decline in trade. Trade in 
relative terms can be expected to become less important but political and cultural ties can be 
expected to grow.549 Even in 1992, it was clear that these growing ties were evidence that 
“the Japanese dimension in the New Zealand consciousness has become much larger. It has 
acquired a momentum of its own.”550 
A number of ties and shared values have formed a foundation upon which the current Japan-
New Zealand relationship stands. Bilateral consultation between both countries is regular. 
Exchanges and study tours help to improve mutual understanding of each other’s 
parliamentary systems such as the New Zealand Prime Minister’s Fellow programme which 
was established in 1990 to encourage an interest in and understanding of New Zealand affairs 
among Japanese officials.551 The ‘New Level of Engagement’ programme was established 
to improve bilateral relations and to improve contact with regards to “the areas of tourism, 
people-to people exchanges, science and technology, forestry, education, and trade and 
investment facilitation.”552 On the whole, both countries share similar views and policies 
regarding global issues. On his 2013 visit to New Zealand, Japan’s Foreign Minister, 
Kishida, celebrated the “excellent government-level bilateral relationship” both countries 
have formed through the many “multi-layered cultural interactions” and people-to-people 
relations in a variety of areas.553 Kishida acknowledged that while Japan and New Zealand 
may not be close in geographical terms, “we have formed such a close connection based 
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upon our shared interests and values.”554 
In this speech, Kishida reiterated the strong relationship the countries share and the vital 
roles both countries play in the Pacific. He reaffirmed the shared values of democracy and 
the rule of law and expressed his wish for both countries to be a part of strengthening regional 
organisations, such as APEC, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum as 
well as strengthening relations with Pacific nations. He acknowledged the earthquake 
disasters both countries experienced in 2011 and the bonds that were formed following the 
disasters.555 While the issue of whaling was not directly addressed, the Foreign Minister 
spoke of the national interest of both countries “to make the seas in the region open, free, 
and peaceful through assuring the rule of law at sea,” while suggesting that as two Pacific 
Ocean countries, “it is important to reaffirm our co-operative strategic relationship which 
shares a vision of the Asia-Pacific region based on such universal values.”556 While the issue 
of Japan’s whaling programme is still a source of conflict in the relationship, the last decade 
has seen relatively strong and close relations between the two countries. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
A clearer understanding of New Zealand’s foreign policy depends on a better understanding 
of the various key traits that contribute to New Zealand’s national identity as a whole. These 
include its historic and cultural ties with Britain, its search independence and a ‘moral’ self-
image, a growing conceptualisation of itself as an Asian Pacific nation and its role as a 
liberally democratic ‘good international citizen’. History and geography have played a 
significant role in shaping these conceptions which have changed over time. Attention to the 
value differences with other nations, and how these values have evolved and interacted, 
contribute to an understanding of how they have affected the Japan-New Zealand 
partnership. While New Zealand and Japan have the commonality of being liberally 
democratic nations with a belief in free market economics, which has created a strong basis 
upon which the relationship is built, differences in values have led to various disagreements 
and challenges in the relationship. New Zealand’s values have evolved over the relationship 
and this has influenced its relationship with Japan. In the years following the Second World 
War, New Zealand’s initial desire to retain a strong European connection and remain as 
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“British” as possible has largely been replaced by a growing sense of independence and a 
national sense of being a regionally engaged, multicultural Asia Pacific nation. Differences 
in values and norms that arose as a result of these developing identities can contribute to 
explaining past differences, and a more nuanced understanding of these differences as well 
as aspects of commonality, can help inform the nature of relations and policy decisions New 
Zealand will take. Without the sense of closeness which is evident in New Zealand’s 
relationship with countries like the United Kingdom and Australia which shared a history 
and culture, an analysis of the Japan-New Zealand partnership demonstrates that the 
relationship needs particular attention in order to reach its full potential. Values and 
ideational social factors, as well as interests, inform a significant part of the relationship and 
play a vital role in explaining the challenges that have arisen despite the relatively close 
relations these two democratic nations share.  
 
While New Zealand national identity has been analysed from various sociological, historical 
and political perspectives, there has been little attention given in literature to the role identity 
has played in understanding New Zealand’s foreign relations. The insight offered by 
considering the role of New Zealand’s identity in its relationship with Japan demonstrates 
the significance of values and norms in explaining New Zealand’s foreign policy. While the 
relationship has been discussed in literature from a historical perspective, an application of 
identity to the relationship offers an understanding of events and  policy decisions which 
other theoretical approaches cannot explain, and which a general overview of relations in a 
historical or diplomatic sense fail to address fully.   
 
An analysis of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan demonstrates that there is no one, 
single, over riding identity that informs New Zealand’s contact and dealings with other 
countries. It is equally apparent from this example that New Zealand’s interactions with 
other countries are not determined solely by ‘rational’ or ‘natural’ material interests such as 
trade, power and security. These interests are clearly important but cannot adequately 
explain the evolution of Japan-New Zealand relations, nor the nature of the interactions 
between both countries. While rational choice approaches can contribute to an understanding 
of some situations, they are inadequate in explaining state interactions due to their failure to 
acknowledge the significance of reification and social constructions in bilateral relations 
between countries. The power of self-identity on international perceptions is clear 
throughout the Japan-New Zealand relationship. 
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This research has presented an analysis of the challenges regarding New Zealand relations 
with, and perceptions of, Japan from the end of the Second World War until the present. It 
has explored the varying ways in which New Zealand’s own domestic affairs and identity 
have influenced official and popular understandings of Japan. New Zealand’s multiple 
identities have created perceptions among both New Zealand leaders and the public which 
have caused them to view Japanese people and the importance of Japan in a certain way. 
National identity is not fixed or static, it is malleable and constantly changing due to both 
internal and external factors. Nor is a national self-image informed by one identity, nations 
have multiple social identities which contribute to determining “who they are” in a situation 
and therefore how to behave. The different identities seen to be held by New Zealand 
illustrate this.  
New Zealand’s interactions with Japan serves to reinforce the idea that domestic agendas 
and attitudes played a significant role in the construction of the country’s Japan policy. There 
were a number of areas and ways in which identity perceptions shaped diplomatic relations. 
New Zealand’s “orientalist” view of Japan informed early contact following World War Two 
and this remained to some extent throughout the twentieth century. Concern and distrust over 
the Japanese national character initially created apprehension and uncertainty as to whether 
New Zealand should pursue contact with Japan and this influenced New Zealand policy with 
regards to the country. Suspicion and wariness gave way to trust and a realisation of Japan’s 
importance to New Zealand’s future and the acknowledgment that New Zealand needed to 
implement policies and improve the means to facilitate increased interaction with Japan. 
However, New Zealand again encountered difficulty aligning its own identity as that of an 
English speaking, culturally European state with that of Japanese culture. Policies and 
initiatives established and encouraged by both the New Zealand government and public 
sought to improve social, political and economic relations and these were successful to 
varying extents. 
It is clear these national interests are born from a range of domestic and political processes 
which consider not only the costs and benefits of its behaviour and interactions with other 
states, but also “what kind of country New Zealand is and ought to be.”558 The difficulties 
and challenges faced by New Zealand officials and policy makers in their relations with 
Japan are a social construct. They have been shaped through historical interactions and 
informed by New Zealand’s sense of self and how it views Japan and Japanese people. 
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Despite some challenges in the relationship, the Japan-New Zealand partnership is founded 
on a similar set of ideals, interests and values while both sharing important roles in the Asia 
Pacific region. This has allowed for a strong relationship since diplomatic contact was first 
established and has meant the foundation of the relationship has remained strong even in 
politically difficult times.  
Shared values, traditions and history have connected New Zealand to Anglosphere nations 
and this has in large part shaped New Zealand’s identity. Throughout most of the two 
countries bilateral history, Japan has ranked in importance with New Zealand’s other major 
partners of Britain, Australia and the United States, in its dealings with Japan. There has 
been little commonality in New Zealand’s association with Japan, having lacked the 
common historical experience, cultural and sentimental links that New Zealand has shared 
with other countries. For much of New Zealand’s history, it was only in Japan in which New 
Zealand was confronted with a significant international partner which differed profoundly 
from it in terms of history, culture and language. New Zealand therefore faced new 
challenges in its association with Japan and came to realise the limits of its power. The 
manner in which New Zealand responded to Japan difference and the way in which it 
illustrates New Zealand’s evolving perceptions and attitudes to itself and the rest of the world 
makes the development of New Zealand’s relationship with Japan an interesting case study.  
However, this relationship in undergoing a profound change as New Zealand’s demography 
and changing relationship with other states have demonstrated the emergence of a new 
identity for New Zealand. The predisposition that shaped New Zealand in the twentieth 
century are changing as New Zealand develops ties and undergoes a shift in perspective 
about how it sees the rest of the world. New Zealand’s interests and values once aligned with 
the Atlantic, English speaking countries. However, the country’s changing identity and place 
in the world has caused it to seek relations with nations very different from its original 
values. Japan was arguably the first significant diplomatic and economic partnership in 
which New Zealand was required to do this.  
New Zealand continues to redefine its self-image and re-position its role in the international 
arena. Japan is certainly an established Asian nation but as New Zealand’s identity and 
interests change, New Zealand is endeavouring to position itself within the developing Asian 
regional framework and forge an identity as an Asian nation. Shared values, history, 
traditions and ideals can explain New Zealand’s partnerships with Anglo-European nations. 
However, New Zealand is increasingly under the impression that it must be prepared to know 
and appreciate the interests and identities of the states it has ties with, both old and new. 
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The relationship has expanded from initially narrow beginnings to a partnership which 
includes not only political and economic relations, which primarily involve the government, 
but also contact on many other levels such as in cultural, academic, and commercial areas. 
Cultural linkages have steadily increased over the recent decades and current trends support 
this strong connection. Many of these ties are ongoing and embedded. Both nations have 
shared these links since the establishment of diplomatic contact following the war. While 
the relationship may not have the rapid expansion and enthusiasm which New Zealand’s 
relationship with China has taken on, it is evident the relationship for many years has been 
“mature, steady, and dependable”559 and will likely continue to be so. 
The New Zealand-Japan relationship is currently multi-faceted and encompasses relations 
in both governmental and non-governmental spheres. While trade with Japan, in relative 
terms, has decreased in importance for New Zealand, it can be expected that cultural and 
political ties will continue to develop and strengthen. Despite issues that may arise in the 
relationship, it is likely that the bond between Japan and New Zealand will stay resolute, 
with a growing mutual understanding of each other. In many areas bilateral relations between 
the countries is deeper than politics, trade or strategic interests. It has many dimensions 
which it is important New Zealand identifies and fosters if the full potential of the 
relationship is to be reached. This thesis argues that a more nuanced understanding of New 
Zealand identity and the values this represents, will enable continuing advances in bilateral 
relations. The importance of identity by both Japan and New Zealand will have a significant 
influence on the nature of the relationship in the future. 
  
                                                             
559 Sullivan, Amicable and Enduring: The New Zealand-Japan Relationship, p.72. 
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